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THE PRIVACY-PROOF PLAINTIFF:  
BUT FIRST, LET ME SHARE YOUR #SELFIE 
 
Joshua M. Greenberg* 
 
The Internet, and social media in particular, provides the 
means by which billions of users may interact with one another in 
the new “global village” and shape and disseminate messages 
beyond the boundaries of the traditional community. As more of 
our interpersonal interactions take place through social media, 
our online presence becomes a manifestation of our existential 
selves, subject to the same reputational and privacy risks as in the 
real world. This Note explores the effect on our privacy interests 
when we use social media platforms without restraint by electing 
to share private information with hundreds or thousands of 
“friends” and second, third, and fourth degree connections. By 
applying the principles of the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine to 
privacy law, this Note argues that there is a point at which broad 
self-exposure negates a reasonable expectation of privacy such 
that consent to disclosure crosses a threshold and extinguishes the 
right to privacy for the entire range of issues disclosed.  
                                                            
* J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2016; B.A. in Political Science, Lehigh 
University, 2013. The author thanks his family and friends for their endless 
support and encouragement and his professors, advisors, and mentors at 
Brooklyn Law School and Lehigh University for their invaluable guidance and 
insight. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Param Sharma, whose 396,000 Instagram followers know him 
as @ItsLavishBitch,1 has been dubbed “Instagram’s Richest 
Teen.”2 His ostentatious Instagram account, which often refers to 
followers as “peasants,” is rich with photos of Sharma’s “$150,000 
diamond-studded watch,”3 Louis Vuitton accessories, Rolls-Royce 
and Bentley cars, and endless stacks of cash.4 In July and August 
of 2014, Sharma attained even greater public notoriety—and 
ridicule—for his over-the-top, pretentious postings after he spent 
ninety days in California’s Santa Rita Jail “for failing to make a 
reasonable effort to find the original owner of an iPhone that he 
sold on Craigslist.”5 A similar online provocateur is Chai Yan 
Leung, daughter of C.Y. Leung, Chief Executive of Hong Kong, 
who received backlash after posting the following on her publicly 
available Facebook page: “This is actually a beautiful necklace 
bought at Lance Crawford (yes- funded by all you [Hong Kong] 
taxpayers!! So are all my beautiful shoes and dresses and 
clutches!! Thank you so much!!!!).”6 
                                                            
1 @ItsLavishBitch, INSTAGRAM (Feb. 16, 2015, 7:30 PM), 
http://instagram.com/itslavishbitch. 
2 Myles Tanzer, Instagram’s Richest Teen Jailed For Selling iPhone On 
Craigslist, BUZZFEED (Sept. 11, 2014, 4:29 PM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/ 
mylestanzer/instagrams-richest-teen-is-jailed-for-selling-iphone-on-
crai#1m323x9. Part of ItsLavishBitch’s mystique is that nobody knows why 
Sharma has so much money or if it is even a real account. See Who’s Behind 
ItsLavishBitch, Instagram’s Richest Troll?, DIGITAL TRENDS (Nov. 5, 2014), 
http://www.digitaltrends.com/social-media/who-is-instagrams-its-lavish-bitch/. 
3 @ItsLavishBitch, supra note 1.  
4 Id. 
5 Tanzer, supra note 2. Sharma was likely convicted under CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 485 (West 2014) (“One who finds lost property . . . and who 
appropriates such property to his own use . . . without first making reasonable 
and just efforts to find the owner and to restore the property to him, is guilty of 
theft.”). 
6 Alan Van, Spoiled Daughter of Hong Kong’s Leader Thanks Taxpayers 
For Funding Her Luxurious Life, NEXTSHARK (Oct. 10, 2014, 4:16 PM), 
http://nextshark.com/spoiled-daughter-of-hong-kongs-leader-thanks-tax-payers-
for-funding-her-luxurious-life/. Chai Yan Leung’s Facebook page has since 
been deleted or hidden. 
 THE PRIVACY-PROOF PLAINTIFF       691 
The handful of viral music sensations who have risen to 
notoriety on Vine,7 including Shawn Mendes8 and Sage the 
Gemini, 9 prove that social media can do more than just breed 
contempt for characters like Sharma and Leung. Mendes, who first 
went viral with his six-second cover of Justin Bieber’s “As Long 
As You Love Me,” now boasts 3.7 million followers on Vine.10 
Mendes is represented by Island Records and recently released a 
single, entitled “Life of the Party.” The single “sold 148,000 copies 
in its first week and reached No. 24 on the Billboard Hot 100, 
making him the youngest artist ever to enter the top 25 of the chart 
with his first release.”11 Sage the Gemini, who has also signed with 
a record label, “enjoyed a reported 583% spike in single sales last 
summer after his song ‘Gas Pedal’ appeared in numerous dance 
videos on the social network [Vine].”12 Record label executives 
point out that, just as MySpace and YouTube served as a 
springboard for several celebrity artists such as Colbie Callait and 
Justin Bieber, respectively, Vine may be the next frontier for 
cultivating and scouting musical talent.13 
                                                            
7 See Regge Ugwu, How Vine Became The Music Industry’s Next Great 
Hope, BUZZFEED (Sept. 14, 2014, 12:16 PM), 
http://www.buzzfeed.com/reggieugwu/how-vine-became-the-music-industrys-
next-great-hope#3d0xj6v. Vine is a website and smartphone application that 
allows users to upload videos no longer than six seconds, which Vine then 
endlessly loops. The service is relatively new to the world of social media but 
has taken it by storm, seeing an average of 100 million visitors each month 
within less than two years of its launch. Id. 
8 Shawn Mendes, VINE (Oct. 3, 2014, 7:18 PM), https://vine.co/u/ 
937830842749816832. 
9 Sage the Gemini, VINE (Oct. 3, 2014, 7:19 PM), https://vine.co/u/ 
938080540966412288. 
10 Ugwu, supra note 7. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id; see also Christine Erickson, 15 People Made Famous by the Internet 
in 2012, MASHABLE (Nov. 15, 2014), http://mashable.com/2012/11/15/internet-
famous-people-2012/ (listing fifteen people who gained notoriety through the 
Internet and social media); Beverly Jenkins, 5 Stars Who Were Discovered By 
The Internet, ABOUT ENTERTAINMENT, http://humor.about.com/od/ 
bestofthebest/tp/5-Stars-Who-Were-Discovered-By-The-Internet.htm (last 
visited March 3, 2015) (discussing Justin Bieber’s use of social media to rise to 
stardom). 
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What do @ItsLavishBitch, Chai Yan Leung, Shawn Mendes, 
and Sage the Gemini have in common? All four, by their own 
exposure and self-promotion, have leveraged their online presence 
into notoriety and small-scale celebrity. All four epitomize what it 
means to belong to the “‘Look at Me’ generation.”14 To this, 
journalist Emily Nussbaum says, “In essence, every young person 
in America has become, in the literal sense, a public figure. And so 
they have adopted skills that celebrities learn in order not to go 
crazy: enjoying the attention instead of fighting it—and doing their 
own publicity before somebody does it for them.”15 Nussbaum’s 
evaluation prompts the primary argument of this Note: there are 
some people who have availed themselves to the public to such an 
extent, whether on social media platforms or elsewhere in the 
“public eye,” that they have consented to widespread disclosure to 
the point where further exposure would be only marginally 
injurious to such persons’ right to privacy. 
The circumstances that give rise to this consent to widespread 
disclosure are best understood through the lens of social media. 
The Internet, and social media in particular, exists in large part to 
reach far beyond the physical and symbolic boundaries of the 
traditional community. Every user has equal capacity and potential 
to shape and disseminate his message to as small or large a circle 
as he chooses.16 As Marshall McLuhan anticipated as early as the 
                                                            
14 THE PEW RESEARCH CENTER, FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, HOW 
YOUNG PEOPLE VIEW THEIR LIVES, FUTURES AND POLITICS: A PORTRAIT OF 
“GENERATION NEXT” 1 (2007), available at http://www.people-
press.org/files/legacy-pdf/300.pdf. This 2007 study from the Pew Research 
Center dubbed “Generation Next,” those aged 18–25, the “Look at Me” 
generation because of their connection to profile-based social media sites on 
which Generation Next-ers share personal information and photos. Id. See also 
Stephanie Rosenbloom, Generation Me vs. You Revisited, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 
2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/17/fashion/17narcissism.html?pagewanted=all
&_r=0. 
15 Emily Nussbaum, Say Everything, N.Y. MAGAZINE (Nov. 3, 2008), 
http://nymag.com/news/features/27341/. 
16 See, e.g., DANAH BOYD, IT’S COMPLICATED: THE SOCIAL LIVES OF 
NETWORKED TEENS 10–13 (2014).  
Four affordances, in particular, shape many of the mediated 
environments that are created by social media . . . . They are: 
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1960s, our technological world has become a “global village,”17 in 
which “people scattered across the globe can now all congregate 
together in cyberspace to share ideas and information.”18 While the 
Internet has become the dominant means of spreading information, 
of course it is not the only place where one can disseminate private 
information. However, this Note will argue that, in some respect, 
social media has become the new town square of this “global 
village.” 
It is not just the Look at Me generation that has become 
inextricably linked with social media. A recent survey by the Pew 
Research Center found that 73% of the 6,010 American adults 
surveyed use a social networking site19 and that Facebook far 
outshines competing social media platforms in number of users.20 
In 2013, “57% of all American adults and 73% of all those ages 
12–17”21 had a Facebook account, amounting to a total of 1.39 
billion monthly active Facebook users.22 Unsurprisingly, with 
many users acknowledging social media platforms as public 
spaces—as opposed to private spaces23—there is a growing trend 
                                                            
persistence: the durability of online expressions and content; 
visibility: the potential audience who can bear witness; 
spreadability: the ease with which content can be shared; and 
searchability: the ability to find content. 
 Id. 
17 MARSHALL MCLUHAN, THE GUTENBERG GALAXY 31 (1962). 
18 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND 
PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET 33 (2007). 
19 MEAVE DUGGAN & AARON SMITH, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, SOCIAL 
MEDIA UPDATE 2013 1 (2013), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/ 
files/2013/12/PIP_Social-Networking-2013.pdf. Respondents self-identified as 
frequent users. Id. 
20 Id. The Pew Research Center’s survey of 1,445 Internet users ages 18 
and older found that 71% use Facebook, 22% use LinkedIn, 21% use Pinterest, 
18% use Twitter, and 17% use Instagram. Id. 
21 Aaron Smith, 6 new facts about Facebook, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Feb. 
3, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/02/03/6-new-facts-about-
facebook/. 
22 Newsroom, Faceboook, http://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/ (last 
visited March 3, 2015). 
23 See DANAH BOYD, WHY YOUTH (HEART) SOCIAL NETWORK SITES: THE 
ROLE OF NETWORKED PUBLICS IN TEENAGE SOCIAL LIFE 7–9 (David 
Buckingham ed., 2007), available at http://www.danah.org/papers/ 
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among social scientists and legal theorists to conceptualize 
normative social behaviors on the Internet and social media so that 
the law may accurately reflect users’ standards for conduct and 
expectations of privacy in the online community. Nearly half of 
surveyed adult Facebook users indicate that “the ability to share 
with many people at once” is a major reason for using the service, 
24 which supports the conclusion that “profile owners typically 
anticipate further disclosure” of the content they post.25 Many 
users are deliberate in the way they maintain their respective online 
personas by developing their own acceptable privacy standards, 
filtering what they post, monitoring what others post about them, 
and curating away items that are not acceptable for public 
exhibition (for example, by untagging26 photos).27 Users seem to 
                                                            
WhyYouthHeart.pdf (referring to social media platforms as “networked 
publics”); Jacquelyn Burkell et al., Facebook: Public Space, or Private Space?, 
17 INFO., COMM. & SOC’Y 974, 983 (2014) (“[S]ocial network participants enter 
into online social spaces with the assumption that the information posted there is 
available to a broad and ill-defined audience with no clear boundaries. As such, 
it appears that online social information is treated as ‘public’ as opposed to 
‘private.’”). 
24 Smith, supra note 21. 
25 Burkell et al., supra note 23, at 980–83. Burkell’s qualitative study 
concluded that, “Even though most of our participants acknowledged creating 
boundaries around their Facebook profile through a friends list (only one had a 
totally open profile), they all tailored their Facebook profile to appeal to a much 
larger audience, as their practices indicate . . . . In very limited circumstances, 
information found on Facebook is considered too personal to be shared, but such 
boundaries appear to be exceptions to a general rule that Facebook is a public 
space.” Id. at 983. 
26 “A tag [or tagging] links a person, Page or place to something you post, 
like a status update or a photo.” Glossary of Terms, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/help/www/219443701509174/ (last visited March 3, 
2015). However, there are only two ways to truly remove a photo from 
Facebook: the tagged individual can either request that the person who posted 
the photo delete it from Facebook, without a guarantee that he will actually 
remove it, or report the photo to Facebook, which may or may not take 
administrative action and remove the photo. What if I don’t like something I’m 
tagged in?, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/196434507090362 (last 
visited March 3, 2015). So while untagging a photo will not expunge it from the 
Internet, the subject of the photo may still distance himself from it and no longer 
give it publicity. 
27 Burkell et al., supra note 23, at 980. 41% of adult Internet users report 
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acknowledge and consent to “online social networks as public 
venues,”28 where a “public disclosure . . . allows discussion within 
and beyond the social connections to whom it is explicitly 
disclosed.”29 The privacy-proof plaintiff doctrine rests on the 
understanding that a social media profile unencumbered by privacy 
settings or viewing restrictions is a public forum and, therefore, 
posting private information by the profile-owner constitutes 
consensual disclosure. 
Kitty Ostapowicz, a New York City blogger, was quoted in 
New York magazine as saying, “Yeah, I am naked on the 
Internet . . . . But I’ve always said I wouldn’t ever put up anything 
I wouldn’t want my mother to see.”30 Suppose that after the article 
was published, Kitty’s nude photos went viral.31 By her own 
                                                            
they have deleted or edited something they previously posted online and 21% 
report asking someone else to remove content posted about them. LEE RAINIE ET 
AL., PEW RESEARCH CENTER, ANONYMITY, PRIVACY, AND SECURITY ONLINE 4 
(2013), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/files/old-media//Files/Reports/ 
2013/PIP_AnonymityOnline_090513.pdf. A survey of social media users ages 
12 to 17 found “59% have deleted or edited something that they posted in the 
past; 53% have deleted comments from others on their profile or account; [and] 
45% have removed their name from photos that have been tagged to identify 
them.” MARY MADDEN ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CENTER, TEENS, SOCIAL MEDIA, 
AND PRIVACY 8–9 (2013), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2013/ 
05/PIP_TeensSocialMediaandPrivacy_PDF.pdf; see also MARY MADDEN, PEW 
RESEARCH CENTER, PRIVACY MANAGEMENT ON SOCIAL MEDIA SITES (2012), 
available at http://www.pewinternet.org/files/old-media//Files/Reports/2012/PIP 
_Privacy_management_on_social_media_sites_022412.pdf (analyzing 
conceptions of privacy on social media sites by demographic and users manage 
their online reputations and personas). 
28 Burkell et al., supra note 23, at 982. 
29 Id. 
30 Nussbaum, supra note 15. 
31  
Viral events are a naturally occurring, emergent phenomenon 
facilitated by the interwoven collection of websites that allow 
users to host and share content (YouTube, Instagram, Flickr), 
connect with friends and people with similar interests 
(Facebook, Twitter), and share their knowledge (Wikipedia, 
blogs). Collectively, these sites have formed a social 
infrastructure that we refer to as social media. In this new 
information ecosystem, an individual can share information 
that can flash across our digitally supported social networks 
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admission, Kitty acknowledges the public nature of the forum on 
which she posted the photos and seems to expect others to view 
and appreciate her blog posts.32 What right to privacy, if any, does 
Kitty retain? This Note argues that Kitty would be privacy-proof, a 
plaintiff who could not bring suit under a theory of invasion of 
privacy because, by her own actions, she consented to the 
disclosure and “has thrown away all or part of his or her privacy 
and, hence, no significant additional privacy remains to be lost.”33 
In a common law system that predicates protection of one’s right 
to privacy on reasonable expectations,34 a plaintiff should be 
estopped, or prevented, from asserting a privacy claim where the 
plaintiff consented to the invasion of privacy by self-exposure or 
self-publication. The privacy-proof plaintiff doctrine is derived 
from the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine,35 which holds where one’s 
reputation has been so damaged by his own actions, he will be 
prevented from recovering damages for further defamation by 
others if determined to be only marginally injurious to that 
plaintiff’s name.36 
Part I of this Note considers the law of defamation—generally 
and on the Internet—and the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine as 
                                                            
with a speed and reach never before available to the vast 
majority of people. It can go viral. 
 KARINE NAHON & JEFF HEMSLEY, GOING VIRAL 2 (2013). 
32 Nussbaum, supra note 15. 
33 Nicholas Gerbis, The Privacy-Proof Plaintiff: A Theoretical Exploration 
of a Potential Legal Doctrine 19 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the 
Journal of Law and Policy). 
34 For tortious disclosure of private, embarrassing facts,  
[T]he facts disclosed to the public must be private facts, and 
not public ones. Certainly no one can complain when publicity 
is given to information about him which he himself leaves 
open to the public eye . . . since this amounts to nothing more 
than giving publicity to what is already public and what any 
one present would be free to see. 
William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 394–95 (1960); see also 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (grounding the concept of legal 
protections based on a “reasonable expectation of privacy”). 
35 Gerbis, supra note 33, at 1–2. 
36 ROBERT TRAGER ET AL., THE LAW OF JOURNALISM AND MASS 
COMMUNICATION 204 (3d ed. 2012). 
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foundational to the privacy-proof plaintiff concept. Part II traces 
the common law growth of the right to privacy in tort and 
constitutional law as a means to protect individual dignity. Part III 
discusses the effect of explicitly or implicitly welcoming others 
into one’s private affairs. Specifically, Part III.A discusses consent 
to disclosure, a complete defense to the privacy torts, and Part III.B 
takes a comparative approach to the way the law deals with self-
disclosure regarding the right of publicity and the case of the 
voluntary public figure. Part IV explains who may be privacy-
proof, proposes a common law framework for the doctrine, and 
addresses how we might square the privacy-proof plaintiff doctrine 
with our interest in maintaining control over our public image 
through, for example, the right to be forgotten. Part V concludes. 
 
I. DEFAMATION AND THE LIBEL-PROOF PLAINTIFF 
 
“Reputation, reputation, reputation! O, I have lost my 
reputation! I have lost the immortal part of myself, and what 
remains is bestial.” – Cassio, Othello37 
 
The libel-proof plaintiff doctrine provides the framework and 
public policy footing for the privacy-proof plaintiff doctrine, 
specifically that a plaintiff may not recover where there is no 
damage to his reputation or privacy interest.38 This section will 
provide background on the two defamation torts—libel and 
slander, discuss the safe harbor provision of the Communications 
Decency Act of 1996 and how these torts apply in the online 
context, and, finally, examine the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine and 
introduce how it might be adapted for the four privacy torts.  
 
A. Defamation 
 
Defamation refers generally to false communications about 
another person that cause such reputational damage that the 
community thinks less of him or third persons dissociate from 
                                                            
37 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF OTHELLO, THE MOOR OF 
VENICE act 2, sc. 3. 
38 Gerbis, supra note 33, at 1–2. 
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him.39 Under the umbrella of defamation sit the torts of libel and 
slander. Libel and slander differ primarily in the defamation’s 
mode of transmission: the law of libel covers written defamatory 
statements, while the law of slander is associated with spoken 
defamation.40 Both torts “developed not only as a means of 
allowing an individual to vindicate his good name, but also for the 
purpose of obtaining redress for harm caused by such 
statements.”41 In suits for libel and slander, the burden rests on the 
plaintiff to prove that the defendant negligently42 published a false, 
defamatory statement of fact concerning the plaintiff.43 Tort 
damages are awarded to plaintiffs on a sliding scale and 
apportioned relative to the harm caused to the plaintiff. Under the 
view of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, any successful libel or 
slander plaintiff may recover general damages;44 a plaintiff does 
not need to show that the defamatory falsehoods caused a 
particular harm or injury.45 Defamation law plays a key role in the 
                                                            
39 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977). 
40 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 568, 575 (1977). 
41 Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 12 (1990). 
42 While the culpability requirement for libel or slander against a private 
person is negligence, courts impose a heightened standard of actual malice for 
public officials and public figures to prevail in a defamation suit. N.Y. Times 
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964); Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 
U.S. 130, 155 (1975). 
43 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 558, 575 cmt. a, 613 (1977). See 
also TRAGER ET AL., supra note 36, at 146–47 (discussing the plaintiff’s burden 
of proof).  
44 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 621 cmt. a (1977). 
45 Id. § 569.  
Damages for libel and slander per se . . . were granted without 
special proof because the judgment of history was that the 
content of the publication itself was so likely to cause injury 
and because “in many cases the effect of defamatory 
statements is so subtle and indirect that it is impossible 
directly to trace the effects thereof in loss to the person 
defamed.” 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 372–73 (1974) (White, J., dissenting) 
(quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 621 cmt. a (1938)). However, a minority of 
states differentiate strict liability libel per se from libel per quod, for which 
plaintiffs must introduce “extrinsic facts to explain how the words were 
damaging.” BRUCE W. SANFORD, LIBEL AND PRIVACY 4-20–4-21 (2d ed. 2004); 
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protecting privacy, for “[i]f privacy is understood as an 
individual’s ability to have some control over the self-image she 
projects to society, then the ability to prevent the spread of false 
information about oneself is essential for this sort of control.”46 
When a person is defamed on the Internet, a question 
commonly arises as to whether the Internet service provider (or 
ISP) or forum website has or should have certain affirmative 
obligations as a matter of law to monitor content and be held liable 
as a distributor.47 Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act 
of 1996 immunizes “interactive computer service[s]” from suits 
based on defamatory material posted by third party “information 
content provider[s].”48 Thus, Section 230 precludes lawsuits that 
                                                            
50 AM. JUR. 2D Libel and Slander § 145 (2014); TRAGER ET AL., supra note 36, 
at 154–55. Courts have not identified what constitutes libel per se as decisively 
as they have for slander per se. The four categories of slander per se are 
instructive in identifying what may qualify as libel per se: accusations of (1) 
criminality, (2) having “a loathsome disease,” (3) conduct “incompatible with 
[one’s] business, trade, profession, or office,” and (4) moral turpitude, or sexual 
misconduct. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 570 (1977); 3 DAN B. DOBBS 
ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 535 (2d ed. 2011). Libel per se is prima facie 
evidence of defamation and the Restatement (Second) of Torts reflected “a trend 
toward limiting per se libels to those where the defamatory nature of the 
publication is apparent on its face, i.e., where the defamatory innuendo is 
apparent from the publication itself without reference to extrinsic facts by way 
of inducement.” Gertz, 418 U.S. at 374. This is distinguished from libel per 
quod, which, “does not appear to be defamatory, but knowledge of additional 
information would damage the plaintiff’s reputation.” TRAGER ET AL., supra 
note 36, at 155; see also DOBBS ET AL., supra. Thus, in cases of libel per quod, 
many states “require proof of special injury in the form of material or pecuniary 
loss.” Gertz, 418 U.S. at 374; see also DOBBS, supra. However, this per se/per 
quod distinction is the minority approach, at least in the pleading stage. Media 
Law Resource Ctr., 50-STATE SURVEY 2012-13 MEDIA LIBEL LAW 1403–10 
(2012). The traditional view of libel remains that any successful libel plaintiff 
may recover general damages. DOBBS ET AL., supra, at 228. 
46 DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 
183 (Vicki Bean et al. eds., 4th ed. 2011). 
47 E.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997); Jones 
v. Dirty World Entm’t. Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 402 (6th Cir. 2014). 
48 Communications Decency Act of 1996 § 230, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2014). 
An interactive computer service provides the technological framework, enabling 
access to Internet services and websites in the operational sense, whereas an 
information content provider “is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation 
700 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
seek to hold an ISP or website liable for its role as a publisher of 
defamatory falsehoods.49 
When applying this safe harbor provision of the 
Communications Decency Act, courts distinguish user-generated 
content that is simply displayed on the website from content that 
the website operator created, either in whole or in part. For 
example, in Zeran v. America Online, Inc., a once-anonymous 
message board poster sued AOL because the service provider 
declined to remove a user-generated post that publicized the 
plaintiff’s contact information and encouraged others to harass him 
for posting offensive content.50 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s dismissal of Zeran’s complaint and held that 
Section 230 protected AOL, in part because of the financial burden 
and infeasibility of requiring “service providers to screen each of 
their millions of postings.”51 The Fourth Circuit also deferred to 
Congress’ policy decision to afford intermediaries statutory 
immunity in order to prevent imposing tort liability on passive 
distributors for other parties’ harmful or offensive messages.52 
It is important to note, however, that Section 230’s protections 
only extend to service providers that are “not also the information 
content provider of the content at issue.”53 Therefore, the court’s 
inquiry will often center on whether the service provider materially 
contributed to the injurious content by, most often, exercising 
                                                            
or development of information provided through the Internet or any other 
interactive computer service.” Id. § 230(f)(2), (3).  
49 Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (“Lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider 
liable for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial functions—such as 
deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content—are barred.”); 
see also Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843 (W.D. Tex. 2007), aff’d, 
528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008) (ruling that MySpace.com was not negligent in 
failing to screen communications between the underage plaintiff and her rapist 
because the claims were “directed toward MySpace in its publishing, editorial, 
and/or screening capacities,” and, thus, MySpace was protected under 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230). 
50 Zeran, 129 F.3d at 329–30. 
51 Id. at 331. 
52 Id. at 330–31. 
53 Jones, 755 F.3d at 408 (holding that a failure to materially contribute to 
editorial conduct immunizes a publisher under Section 230 even where content 
has been provided). 
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some degree of editorial function.54 In Jones v. Dirty World 
Entertainment Recordings, LLC, the Sixth Circuit found a gossip 
website did not materially contribute to libelous allegations posted 
on its site, even though it selected which submissions to publish 
and provided commentary on them.55 A former Cincinnati Bengals 
cheerleader and schoolteacher was the subject of several 
defamatory comments posted on TheDirty.com, which accused her 
of promiscuity and having two sexually transmitted infections.56 
Rejecting the lower court’s ruling that simple encouragement is 
tantamount to a material contribution,57 the Sixth Circuit held 
TheDirty.com’s later comments were not actionable and its 
publication procedures did not amount to “developing” the libelous 
content.58  For a service provider or website to lose its immunity 
under the safe harbor provision, it must add to, develop, or 
somehow further the defamatory content, not simply engage in 
traditional editorial functions,59 “such as deciding whether to 
publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content.”60 
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act has proven 
favorable to passive participants in cases of defamation on the 
                                                            
54 See, e.g., Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. 
Roommates.Com, LLC (Roommates), 521 F.3d 1157, 1167–68 (9th Cir. 2008); 
Jones, 755 F.3d at 408.  
55 Jones, 755 F.3d at 415–17. 
 
56 Id. at 401–06. 
57 Id. at 413–15. 
58 Id. at 416 (“[T]he CDA bars claims lodged against website operators for 
their editorial functions, such as the posting of comments concerning third-party 
posts, so long as those comments are not themselves actionable.”). 
59 Id. at 409–13. The Court relied on the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of 
material contribution:  
[W]e interpret the term “development” as referring not merely 
to augmenting the content generally, but to materially 
contributing to its alleged unlawfulness. In other words, a 
website helps to develop unlawful content, and thus falls 
within the exception to section 230, if it contributes materially 
to the alleged illegality of the conduct.  
Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1167–68. 
60 Jones, 755 F.3d at 407 (quoting Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 
330 (4th Cir. 1997)). 
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Internet.61 But whether libel or slander occur online or 
interpersonally, the key inquiry always comes back to whether the 
defendant publicized an injurious falsehood about the plaintiff.62 
Defamation law’s fundamental assumption, however, is that the 
plaintiff possesses a reputational interest worthy of protection. 
 
B. The Libel-Proof Plaintiff 
 
The libel-proof plaintiff doctrine is a defense to libel actions63 
which holds that a plaintiff may not recover where his reputation 
has been so damaged by previous negative publicity or criminal 
conviction because, in society’s estimation, he is incapable of 
being further defamed.64 Under these circumstances, the libel-
                                                            
61 See, e.g., Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1167–68 (explaining the material 
development test); Jones, 755 F.3d at 408. 
62 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 558, 568, 575 (1977). 
 
63 The libel-proof plaintiff doctrine is just one of many defenses to libel 
actions. For an extensive discussion on defenses, see Charles Delafuente, 22 
AM. JUR. Proof of Facts 3D § 305 (2014). Defenses to libel actions include, but 
are not limited to, truth of the matter, consent, fair comment and criticism, and 
opinion. Id. One of the elements of a libel claim is that the defendant made “a 
false and defamatory statement.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558(a) 
(1977) (emphasis added). “[T]he consent of another to the publication of 
defamatory matter concerning him is a complete defense to his action for 
defamation.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 583 (1977). Criticism of a 
person or institution in the public eye is protected so long as the commentary 
was “the honest expression of opinion on matters of legitimate public interest 
based on a true or privileged statement of fact.” TRAGER ET AL., supra note 36, 
at 191. Courts generally apply the test from Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970 
(D.C. Cir. 1984), to assess whether speech constitutes opinion protected under 
the First Amendment. TRAGER ET AL., supra note 36, at 193–94; see also Gertz 
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974) (“Under the First Amendment 
there is no such thing as a false idea.”). 
64 Note, The Libel-Proof Plaintiff Doctrine, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1909 (1985). 
“While the doctrine has been invoked most frequently on the basis of criminal 
convictions, the doctrine is not limited to plaintiffs with criminal records.” 
Cerasani v. Sony Corp., 991 F. Supp. 343, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (considering the 
plaintiff libel-proof as a result of his numerous racketeering, drug, and fraud 
convictions and indictments). See also, e.g., Guccione v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 
800 F.2d 298, 303 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987) 
(considering the plaintiff libel-proof with respect to his adultery despite him not 
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proof doctrine maintains that a defamation suit is incapable of 
surviving the threshold requirement of reputational harm.65 Libel-
proof status is not one easily conferred and has been described as 
“a forlorn and ignominious status,”66 reflecting society’s 
repudiation of the libel-proof individual. 
The Second Circuit first established the libel-proof plaintiff 
doctrine in 1974 in Cardillo v. Doubleday & Co.67 Robert Cardillo 
brought a libel action against the authors and publishers of My Life 
in the Mafia, the memoir of a high-ranking mobster in the Patriarca 
crime family.68 Cardillo claimed that the book falsely alleged that 
he was involved in mob activity and helped plan a bank robbery.69 
The Second Circuit affirmed the lower court’s dismissal, but on 
different grounds,70 holding that “as a matter of law [Cardillo] 
is . . . libel-proof, i.e., so unlikely by virtue of his life as a habitual 
criminal to be able to recover anything other than nominal 
damages as to warrant dismissal of the case, involving as it does 
First Amendment considerations.”71 The court recounted Cardillo’s 
multiple felony convictions, for which he was sentenced to twenty-
one years in prison, and remarked, “[w]ith Cardillo himself having 
a record and relationships or associations like these, we cannot 
envisage any jury awarding, or court sustaining,” anything more 
                                                            
having been charged or convicted of the crime of adultery). 
65 SANFORD, supra note 45, at 7-118–7-119 (“The libel-proof doctrine is 
based on the recognition that in order for a defamation plaintiff to recover 
damages, he must have a reputation that is capable of sustaining injury due to 
the publication at issue.”). 
66 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION 9-42.1 (2d ed. 1999). 
67 Cardillo v. Doubleday & Co., 518 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1974). See also The 
Libel-Proof Plaintiff Doctrine, supra note 64 at 1909–14 (discussing the origins 
and development of the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine). 
68 Cardillo, 518 F.2d at 639. See also MIKE STANTON, THE PRINCE OF 
PROVIDENCE: THE RISE AND FALL OF BUDDY CIANCI, AMERICA’S MOST 
NOTORIOUS MAYOR 411 (2004) (detailing Cardillo’s association with the 
Patriarca crime family). 
69 Cardillo, 518 F.2d at 640. 
70 Id. at 639. The district court dismissed the suit on First Amendment 
grounds, whereas, on appeal, the circuit court held Cardillo had no cognizable 
injury to his reputation because, again, he was devoid of a reputation. Id. 
71 Id. 
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than nominal damages.72 The ruling in Cardillo provided two key 
factors to evaluate whether a plaintiff is libel-proof: first, whether 
the plaintiff has little to no esteem in the community and, second, 
whether the incremental damage to the plaintiff’s reputation by the 
libel complained of was so marginal that it cannot be quantified 
into some meaningful remedy. 
However, courts have been cautious to deem plaintiffs libel-
proof and have limited the doctrine’s application. One jurisdiction 
has even rejected it outright.73 Not two years after the Second 
Circuit explicated the doctrine, it made clear in Buckley v. Littell 
that the libel-proof doctrine “is a limited, narrow one.” 74 The 
Second Circuit rejected Franklin Littell’s assertion that William F. 
Buckley, Jr., a conservative author and public figure, was libel-
proof by virtue of his controversial political opinions.75 The court 
distinguished Buckley and others with polarizing political views 
from the habitual criminal in Cardillo to say that the libel-proof 
doctrine should be limited to those to who truly cannot rebut 
defamatory comment and criticism because of some prior bad 
act.76 The Second Circuit has continued to reaffirm the doctrine’s 
restraint, stating in a later case, “few plaintiffs will have so bad a 
reputation that they are not entitled to obtain redress for 
defamatory statements, even if their damages cannot be quantified 
and they receive only nominal damages.”77 
                                                            
72 Id. at 640. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal on 
Doubleday’s motion for summary judgment. Id. 
73  E.g., Liberty Lobby v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563, 1568 (D.C. Cir. 1984), 
rev’d on other grounds, 477 U.S. 242 (1986). Then-Judge Antonin Scalia 
rejected the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine, doubting the court’s ability to 
“determin[e] that someone’s reputation had been ‘irreparably’ damaged—i.e., 
that no new reader could be reached by the freshest libel.” Id. at 1568. Scalia 
went on to state, “it is shameful that Benedict Arnold was a traitor; but he was 
not a shoplifter to boot, and one should not have been able to make that charge 
while knowing its falsity with impunity.” Id. 
74 Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882, 889 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 
U.S. 1062 (1977).  
75 Id. at 888–89. 
76 Id.  
77 Guccione v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 800 F.2d 298, 303 (2d Cir. 1986), 
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987). 
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When courts do apply the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine, they do 
so based on either an issue-specific or incremental approach.78 
Under the issue-specific libel-proof plaintiff doctrine, courts 
narrowly consider “plaintiffs who had tarnished reputations 
regarding particular issues prior to the defendant’s statement on 
that issue [to be] libel-proof with respect to the issue.”79 In 
contrast, the incremental libel-proof doctrine focuses on the 
alleged libel in relation to the totality of the plaintiff’s previously 
damaged reputation to ask whether the alleged libel could have 
tarnished his already poor reputation.80 The issue-specific approach 
evaluates the effect of libelous statements on a particular subject 
matter relating to the plaintiff, or a dimension of the plaintiff’s 
personality. The incremental approach considers the libelous 
quality of what the plaintiff objected to compared to the 
accompanying defamation he has tolerated or his overall, pervasive 
bad reputation. Whether a court will utilize the issue-specific or the 
incremental approach varies by jurisdiction rather than the facts of 
a given case. 
A California district court employed the issue-specific 
approach and held that a plaintiff was libel-proof regarding his 
alleged financial exploitation of his romantic partners. In Wynberg 
v. National Enquirer, Inc., Henry Wynberg brought a libel action 
against a national tabloid for running an article that implied he 
took advantage of actress Elizabeth Taylor and her fortune over the 
course of their relationship.81 The court detailed Wynberg’s 
extensive criminal history—which included convictions for 
prostitution, sexual encounters with minors, fraud, and various 
drug charges—and noted his “reputation for taking advantage of 
                                                            
78 The Libel-Proof Plaintiff Doctrine, supra note 64, at 1910. Compare 
Wynberg v. Nat’l Enquirer, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 924 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (taking the 
issue-specific approach in applying the libel-proof plaintiff doctrine), with 
Simmons Ford, Inc. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 
742 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (taking the incremental approach in applying the libel-
proof plaintiff doctrine). 
79 The Libel-Proof Plaintiff Doctrine, supra note 64, at 1911 (emphasis 
added). 
80 Id. at 1912–13. 
81 Wynberg, 564 F. Supp. at 925. 
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women generally, and of Miss Taylor specifically.”82 Adopting the 
issue-specific approach, the court explained, “an individual who 
engages in certain anti-social or criminal behavior and suffers a 
diminished reputation may be libel-proof as a matter of law, as [the 
alleged libel] relates to that specific behavior.”83 These allegations 
did little to harm Wynberg’s already irreparably damaged 
reputation relating to his unscrupulous past with women. However, 
whether an individual’s predicate “anti-social or criminal 
behavior” quashes his reputational interest is highly contextual and 
fact-specific.84 
Alternatively, a New York district court adopted the 
incremental scheme in Simmons Ford, Inc. v. Consumers Union of 
the United States, Inc.85 In Simmons, a dealer of Seabring-
Vanguard cars challenged an inaccurate statement in Consumer 
Reports about the CitiCar’s exemption from federal safety 
standards.86 The court found the alleged libel: 
Could not harm [the plaintiffs] in any way beyond 
the harm already caused by the remainder of the 
article . . . . Given the abysmal performance and 
safety evaluations detailed in the article, plaintiffs 
could not expect to gain more than nominal 
damages based on the addition to the article of the 
misstatement.87 
The incremental approach puts much more weight on the context 
in which the allegedly defamatory statements were made. The 
court concluded that the challenged statements that cast doubt on 
the CitiCar’s design and safety were minimally injurious in 
relation to the more critical, unchallenged statements by a safety 
expert who referred to the vehicles as “extremely dangerous and 
unsafe” and “wholly unsuited for transportation on the public 
                                                            
82 Id. at 928. 
83 Id. 
84 Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 
1062 (1977). 
85 Simmons Ford, Inc. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 516 
F. Supp. 742 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
86 Id. at 745. 
87 Id. at 750–51. 
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highway.”88 The challenged statements could not have been 
damaging when considering the true statements, which called 
CitiCar’s safety record into question. 
The case of Howard K. Stern, Anna Nicole Smith’s former 
domestic partner, demonstrates the narrow scope of this doctrine.89 
A New York district court judge ruled that while Stern was the 
“subject of critical discussion on tabloid television” surrounding 
Smith and her death in 2007, the criticism did not render him 
immune to further defamation as a result of additional false 
allegations.90 The court reasoned “[t]hat [even though] someone 
has been falsely called a thief in the past does not mean he is 
immune from further injury if he is falsely called a thief again.”91 
Prior false accusations that Stern somehow facilitated Anna Nicole 
Smith’s death, which certainly damaged Stern’s reputation, did not 
render him immune to subsequent libelous allegations that he was 
a drug user, had a sexual relationship with the father of Smith’s 
child, and pimped Smith.92 This holding makes clear that only a 
truthful prior bad act or public matter may serve to eliminate a 
party’s right to recover for defamation. Had the allegations that 
Stern was involved in Smith’s death been true or had Stern been 
prosecuted in connection with Smith’s death, he would likely be 
considered libel-proof on the incremental theory based on these 
prior bad acts.93 However, libel that begets more libel is 
insufficient to deprive a plaintiff of this tort action.94 
                                                            
88 Id. at 744–45, 750. 
 
89 Stern v. Cosby, 645 F. Supp. 258, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). In this case, 
Cosby had libeled Smith and Stern in her book, Fame and Miss Fortune: Secrets 
from Inside the Anna Nicole Smith Media Storm, writing, among other things, 
that Stern was gay and had slept with Larry Birkhead, the father of Smith’s 
daughter; Stern and Smith abused illegal drugs; Stern had pimped Smith; Stern 
was a thief; and Stern had motive to kill Smith. Id. at 267–68. 
90 Id. at 270. 
91 Id. at 270–71. 
92 Id. at 266–70. 
93 “Suppose, for example, that an individual is identified in an article as a 
thief, child molester, and tax evader. If all of those charges are true, does it make 
any difference if the articles also falsely identifies the individual as a 
kidnapper?” TRAGER ET AL., supra note 36, at 204. 
94 Stern, 645 F. Supp. at 270–71. 
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  This line of cases, from Cardillo to Stern, forms a doctrine 
that—though limited in its application—illustrates that “[r]ights 
are not immutable. They may be signed away, rescinded or 
suspended . . . .”95 Consider the benefit personality or reputation 
confers on each individual person in the context of a utility scale. 
The tabula rasa,96 he who is untainted by societal judgment, 
enjoys the full utility of his reputation. As life goes on, we expend 
a util97 here, a util there, but most of us do not deplete the value of 
our reputations. “As the amount of reputation remaining 
approaches zero, the possibility of harm—and the amount of 
recoverable damages—also approaches zero.”98 Of course we have 
varying sensitivities to what we each wish to keep private and 
make public, however, there is an objective usefulness or value to 
one’s reputation and privacy, which, as a matter of public policy, 
we protect with defamation and privacy laws. There are no 
damages to be recovered where there is no reputational interest to 
be injured. This too can be said for one’s right to privacy—privacy 
loses its utility as private facts are made public; as more private 
information is made public, the need for privacy protections 
lessens because there is objectively less to protect. To allow 
recovery for one of the privacy torts, courts must be sure the value 
of the plaintiff’s privacy has not dissipated and the possibility of 
harm is real. 
The proposed test in Part IV of this Note conforms more 
closely to the issue-specific approach to determine whether a 
plaintiff has become privacy-proof. As a matter of public policy, 
society views privacy rights as preserving the value of personhood. 
Thus, loss of privacy is more palatable and consistent with our 
                                                            
95 Gerbis, supra note 33, at 25. 
96 First conceptualized by Aristotle, the mind as a tabula rasa (“blank 
slate”) is attributed to John Locke, who wrote that we are each born with minds 
untainted and our understanding of the world comes from sensory experiences 
and human constructs. JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN 
UNDERSTANDING bk. II, ch. 1–2 (n.p. 1689). 
97 In economics, a “util” is the hypothetical unit used to measure added or 
diminished consumer usefulness or satisfaction (i.e., utility). JOHN BLACK ET 
AL., A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, “util” (3d ed. 2009). 
98 Gerbis, supra note 33, at 17–18. 
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liberal sensibilities when limited to specific, contoured subject 
matter rather than treating “one’s reputation [as] a monolith, which 
stands or falls in its entirety.”99  
 
II. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
 
Privacy rights emerged, in large part, from common law as 
society became more complex, technology became more advanced, 
and our concept of personhood and natural law became more 
sophisticated and enlightened. Thus, the development of a coherent 
doctrine that constitutes “the right to privacy” was largely an 
exercise in mosaic jurisprudence.100 In their seminal article The 
Right to Privacy, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis reviewed 150 
years of privacy-oriented case law and are considered the first to 
conclude that the law ought to provide a cause of action to protect 
privacy.101 Seventy years later, William Prosser took note of how 
the law developed around Warren and Brandeis’ right to privacy 
and expanded on the doctrine by defining four fundamental 
privacy torts later adopted by the Restatement (Second) of Torts: 
intrusion, public disclosure of private facts, false light, and 
                                                            
99 Liberty Lobby v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563, 1568 (D.C. Cir. 1984), rev’d 
on other grounds, 477 U.S. 242 (1986). 
100 The mosaic theory of the law assembles case law and legal doctrine to 
evidence a larger, Gestaltist picture of some legal or public policy issue—here, 
cases which were protective of privacy, though not necessarily fitting cleanly 
within the traditional trespass framework, incidentally created a new cause of 
action for invasion of privacy. Justice Samuel Alito’s concurrence in United 
States v. Jones took this approach to the Fourth Amendment, stating the Court 
“need not identify with precision the point at which the tracking of [Jones’] 
vehicle became a search,” rather that law enforcement’s actions, taken together 
over the course of four weeks, constituted a search. 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) 
(Alito, J., concurring). The mosaic theory has also appeared in the discussions of 
the effect of bulk data (metadata) collection on privacy. E.g., Am. Civil 
Liberties Union v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 750 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
101 Samuel L. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. 
L. REV. 193 (1890). One of Warren and Brandeis’ first observations in surveying 
this case law was that privacy issues had been shoehorned into property and 
defamation actions, though the injuries were distinct and begged for their own 
cause of action. Id. at 193–205. 
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appropriation.102 In addition to doctrinal evolutions in tort law, 
constitutional law cases that address procedural and substantive 
due process have rounded out privacy law by creating a cause of 
action for a right to privacy exercisable against the government as 
opposed to private individuals.103 Taking these developments 
together, Daniel Solove has offered six general headings by which 
to categorize modern legal conceptions of privacy: 
(1) the right to be let alone—Samuel Warren and 
Louis Brandeis’s famous formulation for the right 
to privacy; (2) limited access to the self—the ability 
to shield oneself from unwanted access by others; 
(3) secrecy—the concealment of certain matters 
from others; (4) control over personal 
information—the ability to exercise control over 
information about oneself; (5) personhood—the 
protection of one’s personality, individuality, and 
dignity; and (6) intimacy—control over, or limited 
access to, one’s intimate relationships or aspects of 
life.104 
All six functions of privacy law come into play in considering the 
lengths to which a potentially privacy-proof plaintiff has gone to 
retain his privacy: has he shielded himself against unwelcome 
curiosity? Is his life an open book or has he kept certain private 
facts known to only a select few? Has he used social media sites’ 
various self-help controls to limit personal information to a tailored 
circle of friends, family, acquaintances, or similar connections? 
The remainder of this section will trace the growth of this 
bundle of rights—from Warren and Brandeis to Solove—to present 
the common policy thread that runs through this body of law: that 
the right of the individual to be secure in his private affairs is of the 
utmost importance. Yet this right is not absolute, especially when it 
is devalued or voluntarily discarded. 
 
                                                            
102 Prosser, supra note 34, at 389; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 652A (1977). 
103 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
104 Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 
1092 (2002). 
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A. Doctrinal Beginnings with Warren and Brandeis 
 
Common law once limited tort actions to instances of “physical 
interference with life and property, for trespass vi et armis.”105 
Warren and Brandeis argued that this limitation failed to protect an 
evolved understanding of personal rights, namely that the right to 
life includes the right “to be let alone”106 and that property rights 
safeguard both the “intangible, as well as tangible.”107 At that time, 
a plaintiff whose sense of privacy and peace of mind had been 
violated sustained no actual damages and, thus, was without legal 
remedy under the tort principle damnum abseque injuria, “a loss or 
damage without injury.”108 For example, the law prevented a 
plaintiff from recovering in an action for misappropriation of 
likeness against someone who used, and widely circulated in an 
advertisement, the plaintiff’s portrait because the court found there 
was no legal injury.109 However, Warren and Brandeis suggested 
that the law should reflect a more sophisticated view of privacy 
based on “inviolate personality,” a liberal understanding of 
individual dignity.110 
The impetuses for Warren and Brandeis’ article—advances in 
technology and society’s prying curiosities—continue to plague 
our ability to remain private and differ only by the technology of 
the modern era. Warren and Brandeis wrote The Right to Privacy 
at a time when “[i]nstantaneous photographs and newspaper 
enterprise ha[d] invaded the sacred precincts of private and 
                                                            
105 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 101, at 193. Trespass vi et armis (“by 
force and arms”) was “an action for damages resulting from an intentional injury 
to person or property, especially if by violent means.” “Trespass,” BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). Warren and Brandeis write, at common law, 
“the ‘right to life’ served only to protect the subject from battery in its various 
forms; liberty meant freedom from actual restraint; and the right to property 
secured to the individuals his land and his cattle.” Warren & Brandeis, supra 
note 101, at 193. 
106 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 29 (2d ed. 
1888); Warren & Brandeis, supra note 101, at 195. 
107 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 101, at 193. 
108 Id. at 197; “Damnum Sine Injuria,” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 
2009). 
109 Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902). 
110 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 101, at 205. 
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domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten[ed] to 
make good the prediction that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall 
be proclaimed from the house-tops.’”111 Warren and Brandeis’ 
proposed rule of law is rooted in the belief that each individual has, 
to an extent, the exclusive power to determine the scope of 
publicity given to “his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions . . . .”112 
Warren and Brandeis did not propose a distinct rule of law in 
an elemental sense. Rather, they provided general parameters for a 
right to privacy in tort, which should require that the injury 
negatively affect the plaintiff’s interpersonal dealings or “subject 
him to the hatred, ridicule, or contempt of his fellow-men.”113 This 
right would be subject to limitations for newsworthiness,114 
privileged communications,115 oral publication,116 self-disclosure 
or consent,117 and not abrogated for truthfulness118 or absence of 
malice.119 These principles as they related to privacy existed in 
defamation, intellectual property, and contract law prior to Warren 
and Brandeis’ article but only as underlying assumptions and never 
at the forefront of a legal cause of action.120 The Right to Privacy 
laid the groundwork for a legal doctrine that would stand on its 
own two feet. 
                                                            
111 Id. at 195–96 (“Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the 
vicious, but has become a trade, which is pursued with industry as well as 
effrontery . . . . Even gossip apparently harmless, when widely and persistently 
circulated, is potent for evil.”). 
112 Id. at 198–99. 
113 Id. at 197. 
114 “The right to privacy does not prohibit any publication of matter which 
is of public or general interest.” Id. at 214. 
115 “The right to privacy does not prohibit the communication of any 
matter, though in its nature private, when the publication is made under 
circumstances which would render it a privileged communication according to 
the law of slander and libel.” Id. at 216. 
116 “The law would probably not grant any redress for the invasion of 
privacy by oral publication in the absence of special damage.” Id. at 217. 
117 “The right to privacy ceases upon the publication of the facts by the 
individual, or with his consent.” Id. at 218. 
118 “The truth of the matter published does not afford a defence [sic].” Id. 
119 “The absence of ‘malice’ in the publisher does not afford a defence 
[sic]. Personal ill-will is not an ingredient of the offence [sic].” Id. 
120 Id. at 197–214. 
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B. The Right to Privacy as Interpreted by the Supreme 
Court 
 
Justice Louis Brandeis’ dissent in Olmstead v. United States121 
and Justice John Marshall Harlan II’s concurrence in Katz v. 
United States122 go beyond the issue of Fourth Amendment 
protection of one’s “persons, houses, papers, and effects”123 and 
instead utilize a functional interpretation of the Constitution to 
consider whether it provides an inherent general right to privacy 
from governmental intrusion. In Olmstead, the Court held that 
federal prohibition officers did not violate any Fourth Amendment 
protected domain by intercepting Olmstead’s private 
communications because there is no physical invasion in 
wiretapping a telephone.124 However, Brandeis reiterated his 
argument from The Right to Privacy and aligned the protection of 
privacy interests with originalism to offer the following: 
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure 
conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. 
They recognized the significance of man’s spiritual 
nature, of his feelings and of his intellect . . . . They 
sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their 
thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They 
conferred, as against the government, the right to be 
                                                            
121 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 
(1967). 
122 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
123 U.S. Const. amend. IV. This line of cases addresses whether 
wiretapping for the purposes of criminal prosecution violates some right to 
privacy conferred by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution. The 
question presented in Olmstead was “whether the use of evidence of private 
telephone conversations between the defendants and others, intercepted by 
means of wire tapping, amounted to a violation of the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments.” Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 455; Katz, 389 U.S. at 349–50, 354. The 
questions presented in Katz were “[w]hether a public telephone booth is a 
constitutionally protected area” and “[w]hether physical penetration of a 
constitutionally protected area is necessary before a search and seizure can be 
said to be violative of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” 
Katz, 389 U.S. at 349–50. 
124 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 456–57, 464–66. (majority opinion). 
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let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the 
right most valued by civilized men.125 
The Court in Katz later held that the Fourth Amendment “protects 
people, not places.”126 In so holding, the Court overturned 
Olmstead and placed greater emphasis on the interest invaded—
private communications by an isolated speaker in a phone booth—
rather than the fact that the phone booth was located in a public 
place.127 Harlan’s concurrence in Katz took this line of reasoning a 
step further to validate that the spirit of the Constitution and the 
intent of the Fourth Amendment confer “a reasonable expectation 
of privacy.”128 
In addition to finding a right to privacy in the criminal context, 
such as in Katz, the Supreme Court has gone on to expand the 
scope of privacy rights as a dimension of substantive due process 
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.129 Substantive due process protects certain civil 
liberties not mentioned in the Constitution but identified by courts 
as fundamental to the notion of liberty such that the State’s 
invasion upon these interests is subjected to heightened judicial 
scrutiny.130 This is complimented by procedural due process, 
guaranteed by the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments, which 
protects individuals against the coercive power of government and 
ensures the fairness of judicial proceedings.131 Griswold v. 
Connecticut132 was the first case in which the Supreme Court 
found a right to privacy as a guarantee of substantive due process. 
In that case, the Court struck down a law that criminalized the use 
                                                            
125 Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
126 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (emphasis added). 
127 Id. at 350–51 (“What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in 
his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But 
what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, 
may be constitutionally protected.”). 
128 Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
129 “[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
130 Erwin Chermerinsky, Substantive Due Process, 15 TOURO L. REV. 
1501, 1502 (1999). 
131 Id. at 1501. 
132 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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of contraceptives because the law violated “the notions of privacy 
surrounding the marriage relationship.”133 While the Constitution 
is famously silent on any explicit right to privacy, Justice William 
O. Douglas wrote, “specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have 
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees” which 
create certain “zones of privacy”—and the marital relationship is 
one such zone.134 In Justice John Paul Stevens’ view, Griswold v. 
Connecticut and its progeny can be reduced to protecting at least 
two fundamental interests: “avoiding disclosure of personal 
matters . . . [and] independence in making certain kinds of 
important decisions.”135 
                                                            
133 Id. at 486. 
134 Id. at 484. Specifically, Justice Douglas cites the First, Third, Fourth, 
Fifth, and Ninth Amendments as those which create zones of privacy. Id. See 
also TRAGER ET AL., supra note 36, at 227. In subsequent cases, the Supreme 
Court recognized other zones of privacy. For example, in Moore v. City of East 
Cleveland, a housing ordinance, which limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to 
members of a single, nuclear family, did not withstand rational basis review and 
was thus unconstitutional because “freedom of personal choice in matters of 
marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (quoting 
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639 (1974)). In Cruzan v. 
Director, Missouri Department of Health, the Court recognized a zone of 
privacy around an individual’s right to refuse certain medical treatment. 497 
U.S. 261 (1990). The Court elaborated, holding that under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, competent persons have a “constitutionally protected liberty 
interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment” where the choice at issue is 
informed and voluntary. Id. at 278. “Because our notions of liberty are 
inextricably entwined with our idea of physical freedom and self-determination, 
the Court has often deemed state incursions into the body repugnant to the 
interests protected by the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 287 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring). Finally, in Lawrence v. Texas, the Court recognized a privacy zone 
around sexual conduct of consenting adults. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Striking down 
Texas’ anti-sodomy law, the Court held:  
The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. 
The State cannot demean their existence or control their 
destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their 
right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the 
full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the 
government. 
Id. at 578. 
135 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599–600 (1977). In Whalen v. Roe, the 
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C. Prosser’s Four Modern Privacy Torts 
 
As the constitutional right to privacy developed, William 
Prosser used common law principles to offer bright line rules for 
what we now consider the four modern privacy torts: intrusion, 
public disclosure of private facts, false light in the public eye, and 
appropriation.136 All four causes of action protect the plaintiff’s 
personal rights which are non-assignable,137 or non-transferrable, 
and—depending on the jurisdiction—die with the plaintiff.138 
These tort actions are based on Warren and Brandeis’ theory, 
rooted in natural law, and are exercisable against all persons.139 
Further, as with libel, the privacy torts do not require the plaintiff 
to plead or prove that he sustained special or particularized 
damages, but simply that a privacy interest was violated.140 Most 
states have adopted some or all of these privacy torts.141 
Prosser’s first tort is intrusion upon seclusion, specifically 
“intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into his 
                                                            
Supreme Court held that the New York State Department of Health’s competing 
interest in preventing the abuse of prescription drugs outweighed a patient’s 
right to privacy in keeping prescription records secret. Id. at 603–04. Some 
consider Whalen v. Roe as having effectively acknowledged a right to 
informational privacy. Gerbis, supra note 33, at 9. 
 
136 Prosser, supra note 34, at 389, 392, 398, 401. These rights are 
exercisable against the world, as opposed to limited to state actors, as is the case 
with constitutional privacy rights. 
137 An assignable right is one that is “transferable from one person to 
another, so that the transferee has the same rights as the transferor had.” 
“Assignable,” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
138 Prosser, supra note 34, at 408. 
139 Id. at 422–23. 
140 Id. at 409; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652H (1977). 
141 According to a survey of the fifty states and the District of Columbia, 46 
of the 51 jurisdictions recognize the tort of intrusion upon seclusion, while 3 do 
not; 42 recognize the tort of publicity given to private life, while 6 do not; 33 
recognize the tort of false light publicity, while 3 do not; and 46 recognize the 
tort of appropriation of name or likeness, while 1 does not. The remaining 
jurisdictions have declined to address these torts. MLRC 50-STATE SURVEY 
2013-14 MEDIA PRIVACY & RELATED LAW 1589–92 (Media Law Resource 
Center, Inc. ed., 2013). 
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private affairs.”142 This cause of action arises when there is an 
intentional intrusion into the plaintiff’s private affairs that violates 
his reasonable expectation of privacy in a manner “highly 
offensive to a reasonable person.”143 It is essential that the subject 
matter of the intrusion was entitled to be private and, in fact, was 
kept private prior to the intrusion—that which is public cannot be 
intruded upon.144 Intrusion claims often involve voyeurism,145 
though the cause of action may extend to overzealous information 
gathering,146 outrageous paparazzi exploitation,147 physical 
trespass,148 and data breach.149 Because the Internet is treated as a 
public forum,150 voluntary online disclosure of private facts about 
oneself extinguishes any future claim of invasion of privacy that 
                                                            
142 Prosser, supra note 34, at 389. 
143 “One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the 
solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to 
liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly 
offensive to a reasonable person.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B 
(1977). See also TRAGER ET AL., supra note 36, at 255. 
144 Prosser, supra note 34, at 391 (“On the public street, or in any other 
public place, the plaintiff has no right to be alone, and it is no invasion of his 
privacy to do no more than follow him about.”). 
145 E.g., Hamberger v. Eastman, 206 A.2d 239 (N.H. 1964) (involving a 
party listening in on a tenant’s residence with a recording device); Koeppel v. 
Speirs, 808 N.W.2d 177 (Iowa 2011) (involving the installation a hidden camera 
in a workplace bathroom). See also Video Voyeurism Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1801 (2004). 
146 E.g., Nader v. General Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765 (N.Y. Ct. App. 
1970) (involving intrusive information gathering, including unauthorized 
wiretapping); Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971) (involving 
an illegal entry and subsequent photographing). See also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b (1977). 
147 E.g., Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973) (involving a 
photographer who took countless unauthorized photographs of and continually 
harassed a public figure and her family). 
148 E.g., Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 
1999) (holding that two undercover reporters had trespassed when they secured 
employment with a grocery store for purposes of investigative journalism). 
149 E.g., Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (involving 
unauthorized copying of confidential files). 
150 See supra notes 19–29 and accompanying text. 
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could have arisen from further dissemination of those facts.151 If 
the facts are voluntarily disclosed, then there can be no intrusion. 
Prosser’s next tort, public disclosure of private facts, requires a 
showing of three elements: first, a person “gives publicity to a 
matter concerning the private life of another;”152 second, 
information is disseminated that “would be highly offensive to a 
reasonable person;”153 and third, the compromised information is 
“not of legitimate concern to the public.”154 The Restatement 
(Second) of Torts has adopted Prosser’s requirement that “the 
matter made public must be one which would be offensive and 
objectionable to a reasonable man of ordinary sensibilities,” 
rejecting any sort application of the thin-skull rule.155 Generally, 
these highly private matters include sexual relations,156 intimate 
details about one’s family life,157 or health issues.158 Daily Times 
                                                            
151 Many courts have held that what occurs in public is not entitled to be 
private and, thus, would not constitute an intrusion upon a plaintiff’s seclusion 
regarding his private affairs. E.g., Sanders v. Am. Broad. Co., 978 P.2d 67 (Cal. 
1999).  
152 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977). 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 Prosser, supra note 34, at 396. The thin-skull or eggshell skull rule 
maintains that a tortfeasor takes his victim as he finds him and the victim-
plaintiff may still recover despite the existence of some preexisting condition 
that may have aggravated the injury. Vosberg v. Putney, 47 N.W. 99, 100 (Wis. 
1890). Prosser writes, “The law of privacy is not intended for the protection of 
any shrinking soul who is abnormally sensitive about such publicity.” Prosser, 
supra note 34, at 396. See also PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 290–93 
(William L. Prosser et al. eds., 5th ed., 1984) (discussing the thin-skull or 
“eggshell skull” rule). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. c 
(1977). 
156 See, e.g., Michaels v. Internet Ent. Group, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823 (C.D. 
Cal. 1998) (preliminarily enjoining the distribution of a sex tape on copyright, 
right of publicity, and privacy grounds). 
157 See, e.g., Y.G. v. Jewish Hosp. of St. Louis, 795 S.W.2d 488 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1990) (finding that plaintiffs retained an expectation of privacy in 
attending a hospital’s gathering of in vitro fertilization patients because plaintiffs 
made reasonable efforts not to be filmed at the event). 
158 See, e.g., Multimedia WMAZ, Inc. v. Kubach, 443 S.E.2d 491 (Ga. 
1994) (involving a plaintiff whose HIV-positive status was mistakenly made 
public). 
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Democrat v. Graham is a commonly discussed case for privacy 
invasion in the face of an embarrassing public exposure.159 Flora 
Bell Graham accompanied her sons through a “fun house” at the 
county fair and, upon exiting the attraction, unknowingly stood 
over air jets which blew Graham’s skirt up and exposed her from 
the waist down.160 The Daily Times Democrat, a newspaper with a 
daily circulation of about five thousand, photographed Graham and 
ran her photo in a story reporting on the fair. The Alabama 
Supreme Court rejected the Daily Times Democrat’s argument that 
the photo was newsworthy and stated, “Not only was this 
photograph embarrassing to one of normal sensibilities . . . it could 
properly be classified as obscene . . . .”161 Even though the photo 
was taken in public, a reasonable person in Graham’s situation 
would be highly offended by an involuntary exposure of her 
intimate body parts. 
Both the torts of intrusion and public disclosure of private facts 
“require the invasion of something secret, secluded or private 
pertaining to the plaintiff,”162 but a principal difference between 
the two is that intrusion addresses the objectionable manner in 
which the information was obtained whereas public disclosure of 
private facts assesses the scope of dissemination.163 Information 
generally cannot be reprivatized once public,164 so it follows that 
where a plaintiff has revealed certain private facts in a public 
forum, such as the Internet, another person cannot be held liable 
for spreading these no longer private facts. 
                                                            
159 Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 162 So.2d 474 (Ala. 1964). 
160 Id. at 476. 
161 Id. at 477. 
162 Prosser, supra note 34, at 407. 
163 “The intrusion itself makes the defendant subject to liability, even 
though there is no publication or other use of any kind of the photograph or 
information outlined.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b 
(1977). “Publicity” within the context of the disclosure of private facts “means 
that the matter is made public, by communicating it to the public at large, or to 
so many persons that the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to 
become one of public knowledge.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D 
cmt. a (1977). 
164 SOLOVE, supra note 18, at 2. This is akin to the legal analogy of not 
being able to “unring the bell.”  
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Prosser’s third tort, false light in the public eye, differs from 
the other privacy torts in that it involves a false statement about the 
plaintiff, or a statement highly susceptible to false interpretation.165 
In an action for false light, the defendant must have known about 
or recklessly disregarded the falsity of the information he 
publicized, in such a way as to place the plaintiff in a position 
“highly offensive to a reasonable person.”166 Misleading 
statements and photographs used out of context are common 
causes for a plaintiff to be viewed in a false light.167 Note, 
however, that false light does not necessarily mean bad light—this 
is where false light differs from defamation.168 For example, 
implying an endorsement that goes against the beliefs and values 
of the so-called supporter may not be defamatory but may still 
falsely associate that person to a trait he finds objectionable.169 As 
with public disclosure of private facts, the fact or material given 
false light is not evaluated by the standards of an extra-sensitive 
plaintiff.170 
Prosser’s final tort is appropriation, which involves “the 
exploitation of attributes of the plaintiff’s identity” or the misuse 
“for the defendant’s benefit or advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or 
                                                            
165 Prosser, supra note 34, at 407. 
166 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977). 
167 E.g., Gill v. Curtis Pub’g Co., 239 P.2d 630 (Cal. 1952) (A couple sued 
when a photo of them embracing accompanied an article about healthy 
relationships appearing in Ladies Home Journal with the caption “Publicized as 
glamorous, desirable, ‘love at first sight’ is a bad risk.”). 
168 SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 46, at 205–06; RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E cmt. b (1977) (“It is enough that he is given 
unreasonable and highly objectionable publicity that attributes him 
characteristics, conduct or beliefs that are false, and so is placed before the 
public in a false position. When this is the case and the matter attributed to the 
plaintiff is not defamatory, the rule here stated affords a different remedy, not 
available in an action for defamation.”). 
169 E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E cmt. b ill. 4 (1977) (“A 
is a Democrat. B induces him to sign a petition nominating C for office. A 
discovers that C is a Republican and demands that B remove his name from the 
petition. B refuses to do so and continues public circulation of the petition, 
bearing A’s name. B is subject to liability to A for invasion of privacy.”).  
170 Prosser, supra note 34, at 400. 
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likeness.”171 Appropriation comes in two forms: unauthorized 
commercialization and exploitation of another’s right of publicity. 
Commercialization generally applies “to someone who wants to 
remain private,” yet the defendant has “us[ed] this person’s name, 
picture, likeness or voice for advertising or other commercial 
purposes without permission . . . causing emotional distress.”172 
Right of publicity “diminishes [a celebrity’s] economic value” by 
“using this person’s name, picture, likeness, voice, identity—or a 
look-alike or sound-alike—for advertising or commercial purposes 
without permission.”173 Appropriation differs from the other three 
privacy torts in that it is often, but not exclusively, encountered 
where the plaintiff has some value or celebrity in his name or 
personality, which the defendant has exploited for the “use [of] 
advertising or for ‘purposes of trade.’”174 Suppose a photo of a 
sorority girl in a bikini somehow found its way from her publicly 
accessible Facebook account to TotalFratMove.com, a site known 
for its objectification of women. Total Frat Move’s mere use of the 
photo as a way to drive web traffic to the site would constitute 
commercial appropriation, regardless of the woman’s lack of status 
or celebrity, or the defendant’s lack of quantifiable monetary gain 
or incentive.175 
Where a plaintiff has welcomed an invasion of privacy, 
whether by opening his private affairs for all to view or publicizing 
private facts, he is said to have consented to the disclosure—a 
complete defense to Prosser’s four privacy torts.176 Inviting people 
into your private affairs is an expected product of interpersonal 
relationships and “mutual revelation” between friends and loved 
ones.177 However, the privacy-proof doctrine captures the rare 
                                                            
171 Id. at 401; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977). 
172 TRAGER ET AL., supra note 36, at 237.  
173 Id. See also SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 46, at 121–22 (defining 
“commercialization” and “right of publicity). 
174 Prosser, supra note 34, at 403, 407. 
175 See, e.g., Cohen v. Herbal Concepts, 482 N.Y.S.2d 457 (1984) 
(reasoning that commercial appropriation occurs whenever it is possible for the 
person to be identified through the appropriated picture in question). 
176 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652F cmt.b, 583 (1977); Prosser, 
supra note 34, at 419. 
177 JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY 
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times when an individual has disclosed private information to such 
a degree that the law must say he has disclaimed all right to 
privacy on the subject of his disclosures. 
 
III. DISCLAIMING RIGHTS THROUGH VOLUNTARY ACTION 
 
When an individual self-discloses certain private information 
in the public domain, he waives his privacy rights, usually on the 
specific issue or range of issues disclosed. Consent is a viable 
defense to a number of torts beyond the privacy realm, including 
defamation,178 negligence (i.e., assumption of risk),179 and 
intentional torts.180 The question of whether a plaintiff gave 
consent in a particular case is rather routine. 
However, despite the bright line rules, courts have not come up 
with a comprehensive test for determining the intended extent of 
disclosure. Consider two cases: Multimedia WMAZ, Inc. v. 
Kubach181 and Fisher v. Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and 
Correction.182 In Kubach, the plaintiff sued a television station for 
failing to properly blur his face and, as a result, identified him as 
being HIV-positive to viewers nationwide.183 Even though Kubach 
had disclosed his illness to approximately sixty friends, family 
members, doctors, and members of an AIDS support group,184 the 
court concluded that Kubach had narrowly tailored his intimate 
circle and “carved out a zone of privacy which he refused to 
relinquish.”185 However, in Fisher, the plaintiff told only four of 
her co-workers about several sexually suggestive incidents with 
her seven-year-old son.186 Here, the court concluded that the matter 
in question was no longer private when the plaintiff discussed the 
                                                            
IN AMERICA 8–9 (2001). 
178 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 583. 
179 Id. § 496A. See also PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 155, 
at 480–98.  
180 See PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 155, at 112–24. 
181 Multimedia WMAZ, Inc. v. Kubach, 443 S.E.2d 491 (Ga. 1994). 
182 Fisher v. Ohio Dep’t Rehab. Corr., 578 N.E.2d 901 (Ohio Ct. Cl. 1988). 
183 Kubach, 443 S.E.2d at 493. 
184 Id. at 494. 
185 Id. at 499. 
186 Fisher, 578 N.E.2d at 902. 
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incidents “publicly and openly” with her co-workers, who then 
relayed the information their employer.187 
To square this discrepancy in which disclosing to sixty people 
is private but four people public, Lior Strahilevitz suggests courts 
should not look at the number of people to whom the plaintiff 
makes a disclosure but rather at the likelihood that the information 
will disseminate beyond those privileged few.188 Strahilevitz’s 
social network theory suggests fact-finders should consider 
structural and cultural variables to determine the likelihood of 
further disclosure, such as how interesting the information is, the 
strength of interpersonal ties within the group and the 
technological means by which information is transmitted and 
received by its members, and the group’s norms in spreading the 
type of information at issue.189 Strahilevitz raises a concern over 
whether the social network theory should be applied as a matter of 
law by judges, who may adhere to bright-line rules at the expense 
of factual incongruities between precedent cases and the case at 
bar, or by juries, who may flexibly apply these factors to inherently 
factually specific privacy cases.190 Nevertheless, as a matter of 
public policy, it is still desirable to provide a practical framework 
for judges and juries to apply particular facts of a given case to 
reach more predictable outcomes so parties may best plan their 
cases and forecast their success at trial.191 
This section will proceed with a discussion of the concept of 
waiver—where there is an interest in keeping certain information 
secret or private, but that information is voluntarily disclosed—as 
                                                            
187 Id. at 903. 
188 Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 37 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 919, 921 (2005). 
189 Id. at 970–71. 
190 Id. at 980–83. 
191 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343–44 (1974) 
(“Theoretically, of course, the balance between the needs of the press and the 
individual’s claim to compensation for wrongful injury might be struck on a 
case-by-case basis . . . . But this approach would lead to unpredictable results 
and uncertain expectations, and it could render our duty to supervise the lower 
courts unimaginable. Because an ad hoc resolution of the competing interests at 
stake in each particular case is not feasible, we must lay down broad rules of 
general application.”). 
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it relates to the privacy torts. It will then turn to the limited-
purpose public figure, one who has chosen to enter the public 
consciousness and thus invites attention, comment, and 
criticism,192 as a model for evaluating whether a plaintiff has 
surrendered a dimension of his personality to the public. 
 
A. Consent to Invasion or Disclosure 
 
Consent is the “willingness in fact for conduct to occur”193 so 
voluntary agreement to or implicit approval for an act such as 
invasion of privacy or disclosure of private information serves as a 
complete defense against the four privacy torts.194 It would be 
unreasonable for a person to have an expectation of privacy where 
he has welcomed the intrusion into his private life, voluntarily 
given up certain private facts, sanctioned some false portrayal of 
himself in the public light, or approved the use of his name or 
likeness. American Jurisprudence states the following regarding 
consent and privacy: 
The maxim of law that one “who consents to an act 
is not wronged by it” applies to the tort of invasion 
of privacy. The right of privacy may be waived or 
lost by consent. Thus, consent to the invasion of 
one’s right of privacy is a bar to a claim for 
damages for such invasion.195 
A waiver to one’s right of privacy may be express or implied by 
conduct—termed by the Restatement (Second) of Torts as consent 
in fact and apparent consent, respectively.196 Consent is expressly 
made when “clearly and unmistakably stated,”197 while consent 
                                                            
192 Id. at 345 (emphasis added). 
 
193 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892 (1977). 
194 Id. §§ 652F, 583; Prosser, supra note 34, at 419. 
195 62A AM. JUR. 2D Privacy § 220 (2014). 
196 Prosser, supra note 34, at 419; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892 
(1977). E.g., Belluomo v. KAKE TV & Radio, Inc., 596 P.2d 832 (Kan. 1994) 
(rejecting a restaurant owner’s claim of invasion of privacy on the grounds that 
he gave written permission to a television news crew to film a health inspection 
of his restaurant). 
197 “Express Consent,” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
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may be implied when the rights holder makes a clear manifestation 
of intent to relinquish that right through his actions.198 
Posting on social media is often considered an implied waiver 
of privacy rights.199 For example, in Sandler v. Calcagni, a district 
court ruled that a victim of cyberbullying who alleged false light 
and publicity given to private life (public disclosure of private 
facts) could not fully recover on those claims because the plaintiff 
made certain private facts public when she posted them on her 
                                                            
198 First Nat. Bank of L.A. v. Maxwell, 55 P. 980, 981–82 (Cal. 1899) 
(quoting Ross v. Swan, 75 Tenn. 463, 467 (1881); 28 Am. & Eng. Ency. Of 
Law, 526) (“‘To make out a case of abandonment or waiver of a legal right, 
there must be a clear, unequivocal, and decisive act of the party showing such a 
purpose, or acts amounting to an estoppel on his part.’ . . . ‘A waiver is the 
intentional relinquishment of a known right.’”); Johnson v. Kaeser, 239 P. 324, 
329 (Cal. 1925) (citation omitted) (“Obviously, a waiver of a legal right may be 
implied as well as express . . . [and] there can be no presumption of such a 
waiver contrary to the plain or clear intention of the party whose rights would be 
injuriously affected by reason thereof . . . . [A] presumptive waiver of a legal 
right may be shown by proving a clear, unequivocal, and decisive act of the 
party ‘showing such a purpose or acts amounting to an estoppel.’”); Bell v. 
Birmingham Broad. Co., 96 So.2d 263, 265 (Ala. 1957) (“A waiver or 
relinquishment of this right, or of some aspect thereof, may be implied from the 
conduct of the parties and surrounding circumstances. While it is to be conceded 
that the intent necessary to constitute waiver may be implied from the act of the 
party involved, the inquiry still is what was the intent of the party as manifested 
by his actions?”). See also Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Waiver or Loss of Right 
to Privacy, 57 A.L.R.3d 16, §3 (1974) (“A waiver of the right of privacy may be 
either express or implied. The right may be waived completely or only in part; it 
may be waived for one purpose and still be asserted for another; and it may be 
waived as to one individual, class, or publication, and retained as to all others . . 
. . Waiver depends upon what [he] intends to do, regardless of the attitude 
assumed by the other party. Therefore, to make out a case of implied waiver of a 
legal right, there must be a clear, unequivocal, and decisive act of the party 
showing such a purpose.”). 
199 E.g., Guest v. Leis, 225 F.3d 325, 333 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Home owners 
would of course have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their homes and in 
their belongings—including computers—inside the home . . . . [However,] 
[u]sers would logically lack a legitimate expectation of privacy in the materials 
intended for publication or public posting.”). Cf. Ehling v. Monmouth-Ocean 
Hosp. Serv. Corp., 872 F. Supp. 2d 369, 374 (D.N.J. 2012) (“Plaintiff may have 
had a reasonable expectation that her Facebook posting would remain private, 
considering that she actively took steps to protect her Facebook page from 
public viewing.”). 
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MySpace profile.200 Similarly, in Pearce v. Whitenack, a Kentucky 
police officer brought suit for invasion of privacy after he was 
suspended for posting about a police matter on Facebook.201 The 
court ruled against the officer because he “ran the risk that even a 
posting or communication he intended to remain private would be 
further disseminated by an authorized recipient.”202 In these cases, 
neither plaintiff gave express consent, yet the courts took an 
approach akin to Strahilevitz’s social network theory in concluding 
that the plaintiffs implicitly manifested their consent when they 
made disclosures on social media that would foreseeably 
disseminate to others. 
The scope of consent may be limited for a particular purpose or 
group of people, as in Multimedia WMAZ, Inc. v. Kubach.203 As 
such, consent is an ineffective defense for an invasion of privacy 
that exceeds the scope of consent.204 Consent may also be 
revoked.205 In Virgil v. Time, Inc., Michael Virgil, a well-known 
                                                            
200 Sandler v. Calcagni, 565 F. Supp. 2d 184, 196–98 (D. Me. 2008). 
Plaintiff asserts that six categories of statements in Help Us 
Get Mia reveal private facts and constitute an invasion of 
privacy for which liability should attach. Specifically, Plaintiff 
alleges that the following reveal private facts: 1) excerpts and 
summaries from her myspace.com webpage; 2) three 
statements related to her Jewish ancestry; 3) her enrollment at 
High Point University; 4) two statements regarding Plaintiff’s 
decision to seek professional psychological care or counseling; 
5) Plaintiff’s transfer from one high school to another under a 
superintendent’s agreement; and 6) two statements regarding 
plastic surgery on Plaintiff’s nose. 
Id. at 197. The Court ultimately rejected claims 1, 2, 3, and 5. Id. at 197–98. 
201 Pearce v. Whitenack, 440 S.W.3d 392, 400 (Ky. Ct. App. 2014). 
202 Id. at 402. 
203 Multimedia WMAZ, Inc. v. Kubach, 443 S.E.2d 491 (Ga. 1994).  
204 See Canessa v. J.I. Kislack, Inc., 235 A.2d 62, 79–80 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
1967) (quoting PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 850–51 (3d ed. 1964)) (“If the actual 
invasion goes beyond the contract, fairly construed, as for example by alteration 
of the plaintiff’s picture, or publicity differing materially in kind or in extent 
from that contemplated, or exceeding the authorized duration, there is 
liability.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 829A(4) (1977) (“If the actor 
exceeds the consent, it is not effective for the excess.”). 
205 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 829A(5) (1977); DOBBS ET AL., 
supra note 45, at § 108. 
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athlete, gave an interview with Sports Illustrated but withdrew his 
consent to publish the article when he learned the piece would not 
focus solely on him as a surfer but also include information about 
his personal peculiarities unrelated to his sport.206 When the story 
ran, Virgil sued for public disclosure of private embarrassing 
facts.207 The court ruled in Virgil’s favor, reasoning even though 
Virgil voluntarily revealed private information to a reporter in 
anticipation of publication, his revocation prior to publication was 
effective to terminate the consent to disclosure to a larger, national 
audience.208 However, Virgil is distinguishable from cases in 
which a private person self-publicizes and then deletes or removes 
private information because Virgil attempted to prevent the 
original release of private information before it was published, not 
curtail the spread of something already public. Once revealed 
online, there is no telling where that publicized information may 
flow. 
Consent forms the basis of the privacy-proof plaintiff in that 
the privacy-proof person, acknowledging the public nature of the 
forum, does not exercise his discretion in tailoring the scope of 
consent, implicitly agreeing to the privacy invasion. Though prior 
consent does not necessarily indicate future consent, the privacy-
proof plaintiff doctrine suggests that future constructive consent 
may be implied from prior conduct. 
 
B. Limited-Purpose Public Figures and Their Entrance 
Into the Public Eye 
                                                            
206 Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1123–24 (9th Cir. 1975). 
207 Id. at 1123. 
208  
Talking freely to a member of the press, knowing the listener 
to be a member of the press, is not then in itself making 
public. Such communication can be said to anticipate that 
what is said will be made public since making public is the 
function of the press, and accordingly such communication 
can be construed as a consent to publicize. Thus if publicity 
results it can be said to have been consented to. However, if 
consent is withdrawn prior to the act of publicizing, the 
consequent publicity is without consent. 
Id. at 1127. 
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The law assumes those who have entered the public eye have 
constructively consented to heightened public scrutiny and a 
greater risk of reputational injury—more than the average, private 
person would have to bear—by virtue of their office, position, or 
status within the community. While this status undoubtedly puts 
public persons under a microscope, the status does not translate 
into consent to unfettered access to their private affairs.209 In suits 
for libel and slander, however, the law imposes a greater burden on 
those in the public eye to prove the alleged defamation was made 
with a heightened level of culpability. Where the plaintiff is one 
with this special prominence, the aggrieved must show that the 
defamatory falsehoods were made with “actual malice,” defined as 
knowledge of or reckless disregard for the challenged statements’ 
falsity, 210 whereas a private person need only prove the 
defendant’s negligence.211 
The Supreme Court first enunciated the actual malice standard 
as applicable to public officials in New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan212 and later extended it to public figures in Curtis 
Publishing Co. v. Butts.213 In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the 
Montgomery, Alabama police commissioner filed a libel suit 
against The New York Times for publishing an editorialized 
advertisement placed by civil rights leaders which accused public 
                                                            
209  
A public figure does not . . . surrender all right to privacy. 
Although his privacy is necessarily limited by the 
newsworthiness of his activities, he retains the “independent 
right to have [his] personality, even if newsworthy, free from 
commercial exploitation at the hands of another.” 
Brinkley v. Casablancas, 80 A.D.2d 428, 433 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (quoting 
Booth v. Curtis Publ’g Co., 15 A.D.2d 343, 226, 228 (N.Y. App. Div. 1962)). 
See also Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973) (finding that “Mrs. 
Onassis was . . . a public figure and thus subject to news coverage . . . . 
Nonetheless, . . . [the conduct at issue] went far beyond the reasonable bounds of 
news gathering.”).  
210 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964). 
211 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B (1977); TRAGER ET AL., 
supra note 36, at 172. 
212 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80.  
213 Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 160 (1975). 
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officials of suppressing the civil rights movement in Alabama.214 
The Court unanimously held that freedom of expression on issues 
of public importance is central to the meaning of the First 
Amendment and, in order to not chill this protected speech, the law 
requires those in positions of public trust to prove actual malice in 
order to prevail on a defamation claim regarding their official 
conduct.215 Justice William J. Brennan Jr., who wrote the majority 
opinion in that case, later provided this definition of who is a 
public official in Rosenblatt v. Baer: “The ‘public official’ 
designation applies at the very least to those among the hierarchy 
of government employees who have or appear to have the public 
substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of 
governmental affairs.”216 Then, in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 
the Supreme Court extended the actual malice standard to include 
public figures.217 In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Earl 
Warren reasoned that public figures play a similar “influential role 
in ordering society” as public officials do and possess the same 
communicative means to respond to criticism.218 As with public 
                                                            
214 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256–58. 
215 Id. at 269.  
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule 
that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a 
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he 
proves that the statement was made with “actual malice”—that 
is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard 
of whether it was false or not. 
Id. at 279–80. 
216 Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966). 
217 Curtis Publ’g Co., 388 U.S. at 155. The case involved an article in the 
Saturday Evening Post that accused the University of Georgia’s football coach 
of fixing a football game between his team and the University of Alabama’s 
football team. Id. at 135–36. 
218  
“Public figures,” like “public officials,” often play an 
influential role in ordering society . . . . Our citizenry has a 
legitimate and substantial interest in the conduct of such 
persons, and freedom of the press to engage in uninhibited 
debate about their involvement in public issues . . . . 
Id. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). 
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officials, public figures must bear an “increased risk of injury from 
defamatory falsehood”219 as a result of their voluntary exposure 
and entrance into the public sphere. 
The definition of public figure was later refined to comprise 
two categories: all-purpose and limited-purpose public figures.220 
All-purpose public figures, primarily celebrities, “occupy positions 
of such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed 
public figures for all purposes” and in all contexts.221 Limited-
purpose public figures, however, are public on a narrow set of 
issues or for a specific purpose,222 “hav[ing] thrust themselves to 
the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence 
the resolution of the issues involved.”223 The Supreme Court 
distinguished these two classes of public figures in Gertz v. Robert 
Welch.224 In Gertz, a magazine concocted a story that a police 
officer was framed and falsely convicted of murdering a Chicago 
youth as part of a communist conspiracy to discredit the police and 
that the victim’s family’s attorney, Elmer Gertz, was a instrument 
of this conspiracy.225 The Supreme Court rejected the publisher’s 
argument that Gertz was a public figure and, thus, should have to 
prove the libelous story was published with actual malice.226 While 
he was active in various civic groups, Gertz was not “atypical of 
the local population” in possessing fame or notoriety to render him 
a public figure for all purposes nor was he even involved in the 
police officer’s criminal prosecution.227 
                                                            
219 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974). 
220 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345. There is a third category: the involuntary public 
figure, “individuals who have not sought publicity or consented to it, but 
through their own conduct or otherwise have become a legitimate subject of 
public interest. They have, in other words, become ‘news.’” Tillman v. Freedom 
of Info. Comm’n, No. CV074044748S, 2008 WL 4150289, at *9 (Conn. Super. 
Ct., Aug. 15, 2008). However, involuntary public figures are “exceedingly rare.” 
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351. 
221 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345, 350. 
222 Id. at 351. 
223 Id. at 354 (emphasis added). 
224 Id. at 345. 
225 Id. at 325–27. 
226 Id. at 351–52. 
227 Id. 
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Generally, the requisite elements of limited-public public 
figure status are: (1) there exists a public controversy and (2) an 
individual, possessing access and opportunity to do so, voluntarily 
injects himself into the dialogue, or “vortex.”228 In Gertz, while 
there was a public controversy around a police officer shooting a 
civilian, Elmer Gertz had not engaged in the issue and was 
considered a private individual.229 Since Gertz, the law has placed 
greater weight on the second prong than on the first; courts have 
even disregarded the public controversy requirement to say that 
“voluntary entry into a sphere of activity . . . is sufficient to satisfy 
this element of the public figure inquiry.”230 Voluntary entry can 
be analogized to voluntary disclosure in the privacy-proof plaintiff 
context. Both are indicative of implicit consent and dispositive in 
determining whether the plaintiff bears a greater legal burden to 
retain his reputational or privacy rights. 
 
IV. THE PRIVACY-PROOF PLAINTIFF: A PROPOSED LEGAL 
DOCTRINE 
 
The premise of the privacy-proof plaintiff doctrine—that the 
law may deprive an individual of his right to privacy in cases 
where the individual publicly provided the information that formed 
the basis of the defendant’s tortious invasion—is grounded in the 
idea of constructive or implied consent. The privacy-proof concept 
takes the principle that one’s right to privacy “can be surrendered 
when facts are voluntarily made public” a step further.231 This next 
step emphasizes that, due to the scope and pervasiveness of the 
self-elected disclosure, prior consent may constitute future consent 
                                                            
228 Id. 
229 Id. at 352. 
230 TRAGER ET AL., supra note 36, at 171. E.g., Chuy v. Phila. Eagles 
Football Club, 431 F. Supp. 254, 267 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (“Where a person has . . . 
chosen to engage in a profession which draws him regularly into regional and 
national view and leads to ‘fame and notoriety in the community,’ even if he has 
no ideological thesis to promulgate, he invites general public discussion.”). 
231 Gerbis, supra note 33, at 25; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 892(2) (1979). “The right to privacy ceases upon the publication of the 
facts by the individual, or with his consent.” Warren & Brandeis, supra note 
101, at 218. 
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on certain aspects of an individual’s private life much like entering 
the public consciousness on a limited range of issues renders a 
once-private individual a public figure. This section will propose a 
framework for this common law rule, delineating its boundaries 
and providing an illustrative hypothetical to guide its application, 
and conclude with a brief discussion of Europe’s right to be 
forgotten and similar theses for rethinking reputation management. 
 
A. The Rule and its Application 
 
A person may forfeit his right to privacy by offering private 
information about himself for public consumption in a forum that 
the actor should reasonably know is available to a wide audience. 
Consequently, that person could not recover for invasion of 
privacy where that once-private information is given further 
publicity or used in a way the plaintiff finds disagreeable. In other 
words, broad self-exposure negates a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, at least on the range of issues disclosed.232 The burden 
would rest on the defendant to prove the following four elements: 
(1) the plaintiff, a private person,233 voluntarily disclosed certain 
private or personal information about himself, (2) the disclosure 
was made in a public forum, (3) the exposure was pervasive, 
whether by its regularity or extremity, and (4) the defendant’s 
                                                            
232 See supra Introduction; see generally Gerbis, supra note 33, at 19–20. 
233 This doctrine is concerned primarily with private persons as opposed to 
public officials or public figures because, while public figures do retain their 
right to privacy to a degree, they are subject to heightened scrutiny (i.e., the 
actual malice standard) by virtue of their notoriety. Scott J. Schackelford, 
Fragile Merchandise: A Comparative Analysis of Privacy Rights for Public 
Figures, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 125, 143 (2012). For example, the Duke and Duchess 
of Cambridge successfully exercised their privacy rights in a suit against a 
French tabloid for photographing the former Kate Middleton topless with a 
telephoto lens from several hundred meters away. Scott Sayare, French Court 
Rules Against Magazine on Royal Photos, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/19/world/europe/french-court-rebukes-closer-
magazine-for-photos-of-kate-middleton.html?_r=1&. While in theory a public 
figure could qualify as privacy-proof, in practice it would take much more than 
simply over-sharing to surrender his right to privacy. An evaluation of this 
doctrine as it applies to public figures is beyond the scope of this Note and is 
more apt for a discussion on the right of publicity. 
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tortious invasion did not exceed the scope of what the plaintiff had 
previously disclosed publicly. 
The first element of the defense, voluntary self-disclosure of 
private facts, is akin to determining whether the plaintiff (by 
electing to make available the information at issue) consented to 
the privacy invasion. Whether expressly given or implied by 
conduct, consent acts as a complete defense to the privacy torts.234 
Posting on the Internet falls squarely within the definition of 
apparent consent to public disclosure: “If words or conduct are 
reasonably understood by another to be intended as consent, they 
constitute apparent consent and are as effective as consent in 
fact.”235 Where the online community’s general consensus has 
been that the Internet and social media sites are in fact public 
forums, an individual who shares private information on those 
platforms would be reasonably understood as tacitly—if not, 
expressly—acknowledging that he is making a public disclosure.236 
Consent may be withdrawn,237 but self-help may not be as readily 
available to a privacy-proof plaintiff because of the breadth and 
depth of the exposure.238 
The second requirement of the defense is that the plaintiff must 
have made the voluntary disclosure in a public forum. Like the 
limited-purpose public figure, the privacy-proof plaintiff will have 
thrust himself into the public consciousness to become part of 
some dialogue.239 The Internet is a public forum,240 and social 
media websites in particular, are designed to create webbed 
communities of various second, third, and fourth degree 
connections and contact points.241 Every major social media 
                                                            
234 Supra Part II; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652F, 583 (1977); 
Prosser, supra note 34, at 419. 
235 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892(2). 
236 Burkell et al., supra note 23, at 983. 
237 E.g., Gager v. Dell Fin. Servs., LLC, 727 F.3d 265, 270–71 (3d Cir. 
2013). 
238 Gerbis, supra note 33, at 22. 
239 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974); supra Part III.B. 
240 Supra Introduction. 
241 BOYD, supra note 16, at 5–8.  
Social media is often designed to help people spread 
information, whether by explicitly or implicitly encouraging 
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website offers and advertises to its users various opt-in privacy 
settings wherein users may approve or reject connections, limit the 
visibility of their posts only to approved connections or “friends,” 
and even create classes of approved and non-approved users or 
viewers among their existing connections.242 Therefore, unless the 
plaintiff has taken steps to limit the scope of his online presence by 
utilizing privacy settings, he will be deemed to have intended the 
postings to be publicly accessible and waived his ability to remain 
private. Even a baseline understanding of these websites would 
reasonably include knowing that there are privacy settings 
available. Notwithstanding opting in to a site’s privacy settings, 
one could reasonably argue that an audience of hundreds or 
thousands of “friends” or connections, even when limited by 
privacy settings, remains a public forum. However, privatizing 
one’s online presence may rebut this element by demonstrating a 
substantial step in limiting the accessibility of one’s postings and 
online content. 
Third, the disclosures that would qualify the plaintiff as 
privacy-proof must have been pervasive, meaning the plaintiff 
posted on the subject matter with great frequency or, in the 
alternative, his posts or disclosures were so inflammatory that he 
was thrust into the spotlight as a result. For example, an over-
                                                            
the sharing of links, providing reblogging or favoriting tools 
that repost images or texts, or by making it easy to copy and 
paste content from one place to another. Thus, much of what 
people post online is easily spreadable with the click of a few 
keystrokes. 
 Id. at 12. 
242 E.g., Basic Privacy Settings & Tools, FACEBOOK (Nov. 26, 2014, 4:55 
PM), https://www.facebook.com/help/325807937506242/; About protected and 
unprotected Tweets, TWITTER (Nov. 26, 2014, 4:56 PM), 
https://support.twitter.com/articles/14016-about-public-and-protected-tweets; 
Controlling Your Visibility, INSTAGRAM (Nov. 26, 2014, 4:57 PM), 
https://help.instagram.com/116024195217477. Statistics vary as to how many 
users actually take advantage of privacy settings. In 2012, the Pew Research 
Center reported that 58% of users have private profiles. MADDEN, PRIVACY 
MANAGEMENT ON SOCIAL MEDIA SITES, supra note 27. In 2013, it was reported 
that 25% of Facebook users did not utilize privacy settings. Brian Honigman, 
100 Fascinating Social Media Statistics From 2012, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 
29, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/brian-honigman/100-fascinating-
social-me_b_2185281.html. 
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sharer who uses Facebook as a personal diary or someone whose 
tweeting attracts widespread (likely, negative) notoriety could 
qualify as having this sort of online presence. As a matter of 
policy, we should not allow someone who acknowledges the open 
nature of a forum to post without restraint and then recover for 
invasion of privacy regarding the range of issues self-disclosed. 
The benchmark for what may be considered pervasive should 
be evaluated by the prevailing expectations of the plaintiff’s online 
demographic. Courts apply “contemporary community standards” 
in determining whether speech or expressive conduct is obscene, 
though, in the context of the Internet, circuit courts are split on 
whether these standards should continue to be measured by local 
community standards or reflect a national composite.243 The 
concern with applying local community standards for speech on 
the Internet is that speakers “cannot tailor their message to the 
specific communities into which they disseminate their speech and 
truly must comply with the standards of the least tolerant 
community.”244 The contemporary community standards approach 
reflects that our regard for what is obscene evolves over time, as 
do our conceptions of privacy. Even though social media users are 
not confined by computer code to only interact with their own 
demographic, their conduct, attitude, and evaluation of others are 
likely driven by their own in-group dynamics and norms. 
Therefore, it would be logical to evaluate reactions to the 
disclosure of private matters based on their community’s 
contemporary expectations. 
The scope of the defendant’s invasion is the final piece to the 
privacy-proof defense. Consent to an invasion of privacy is limited 
by “the language or acts by which it is manifested in the light of 
the surrounding circumstances”245 For the defense to stand, the 
defendant’s tortious invasion cannot exceed what the plaintiff had 
                                                            
243 See United States v. Little, 365 F. App’x. 159 (11th Cir. 2010) (applying 
local contemporary community standards); United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 
1240 (9th Cir. 2009) (applying national contemporary community standards); E. 
Morgan Laird, The Internet and the Fall of the Miller Obscenity Standard: 
Reexamining the Problem of Applying Local Community Standards in Light of a 
Recent Circuit Split, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1503 (2012). 
244 Kilbride, 584 F.3d at 1251. 
245 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 583 cmt. d (1977). 
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made publicly available. It would be most prudent to limit the 
conferral of privacy-proof status to particular subject matters. 
Similar to Liberty Lobby v. Anderson’s rejection of an all-or-
nothing approach to the libel-proof doctrine,246 it would be 
illogical and unreasonable to extinguish a plaintiff’s right to 
privacy in every facet of life simply as a result of his unreserved 
nature on certain subjects. 
In practice, the privacy-proof plaintiff defense would be raised 
at trial, as opposed to on a pre-trial motion for summary judgment, 
because it necessarily involves questions of fact concerning the 
openness of the plaintiff’s forum and, more importantly, the 
frequency or instigative nature of the disclosures. The defendant 
would have the burden of proving, again, that the plaintiff 
voluntarily revealed in a public forum information that his right to 
privacy would typically protect, the dissemination was unbridled 
by available privacy settings and was done in such a manner as to 
draw significant attention either by its frequency or 
provocativeness, and that the defendant’s alleged invasion did not 
go beyond the content of the plaintiff’s prior voluntary, public 
disclosures. 
 
B. Chai Yan Leung Revisited: An Illustrative 
Hypothetical 
 
Recall Chai Yan Leung, the Chief Executive of Hong Kong’s 
daughter who posted about her expensive purchases funded by the 
Hong Kong taxpayers.247 While Leung thrives on attention, she is 
not too pleased at the American press’ reaction to her 
unapologetic, lavish lifestyle and feels she is being maligned on 
the Internet. Leung’s attorney advises her that because her 
Facebook post involved a matter of public interest—the manner in 
which taxpayer money was being spent—the press is protected 
under the fair report privilege.248 However, Leung points out that 
                                                            
246 Liberty Lobby v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563, 1568 (D.C. Cir. 1984), 
rev’d on other grounds, 477 U.S. 242 (1986). 
247 Supra Introduction. 
248 See Salanzo v. N. Jersey Media Group, 201 N.J. 500, 520 (2010) 
(discussing the fair report privilege); TRAGER ET AL., supra note 36, at 188 
(discussing same). 
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the media coverage has had less to do with her expensive Lance 
Crawford necklace, but rather has evolved into investigative 
profiles of Leung, her outrageous posts, and extravagant lifestyle. 
She files a lawsuit in a California federal court for tortious public 
disclosure of embarrassing private facts and false light, claiming 
various websites and individual commenters domiciled in 
California invaded her privacy by delving into her private affairs 
and criticizing her for her material possessions.249 Leung demands 
monetary damages and injunctive relief, specifically that the 
articles be removed. At trial, the defendants assert the privacy-
proof plaintiff defense, stating that Chai Yan Leung is privacy-
proof with respect to her online presence, Facebook postings, and 
materialistic lifestyle, and therefore could not have suffered an 
injury from the alleged invasion of privacy. 
Defense counsel would likely be successful in proving that 
Chai Yan Leung is a privacy-proof plaintiff by proving the 
doctrine’s four elements. First, Leung is a private person and, 
while the possession of certain material items could be considered 
a private fact, Leung inflamed the citizens of Hong Kong when she 
actively flaunted her wealth by posting pictures of her expensive 
purchases funded by taxpayer dollars.250 There is no evidence to 
suggest these photos were taken or that the posts were made 
without Leung’s consent. Though Leung’s father is a public 
official, a court would be hard pressed to consider her a public 
figure. In California especially, children of public officials and 
public figures are considered “off-limits” and not expected to have 
to endure the attention that their parents do by virtue of their 
positions.251 
                                                            
249 In Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, the Supreme Court of California 
adopted Prosser’s four privacy torts. 603 P.2d 425, 428 (Cal. 1979). Under 28 
U.S.C. § 1332(a), a federal court has subject matter jurisdiction over a diversity 
action between a citizen of a State and a citizen of a foreign country where the 
amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. California state law would be applied 
in this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1652 and Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 
U.S. 64 (1938). 
250 Van, supra note 6. 
251 Laura Olson, Paparazzi Bill Passes In California, Protecting Children 
Of Public Figures, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 25, 2013), http://www. 
huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/25/paparazzi-bill-passes_n_3991404.html. 
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Second, Leung’s Facebook posts were made in a public forum 
and clearly intended for public consumption. Prior to this incident, 
her profile was not protected and her posts spoke directly to Hong 
Kong citizens—Leung remarked that her expensive necklaces, 
dresses, and purses were “funded by all you [Hong Kong] 
taxpayers.”252 
Third, Leung’s numerous posts about her spending habits 
allegedly funded by taxpayer dollars were pervasive in their 
extremity. By the tone of the posts and the manner in which Leung 
responded to criticism, the posts were meant to show off and 
provoke. 
Fourth, the alleged invasion of Leung’s privacy did not extend 
beyond comment and criticism of the material she posted on her 
Facebook. Under existing privacy law, Leung may prevail by 
claiming she did not consent to the use or publication of what she 
expected would remain private (i.e., her material possessions).253 
However, having satisfied all four elements of this proposed 
doctrine, Chai Yan Leung would be dubbed privacy-proof within 
the context of the material she posts about her extravagant lifestyle 
and spending habits. 
 
C. Privacy-Proof Status Versus the “Right to Be 
Forgotten” 
 
In 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled that, 
under an EU directive regarding the protection of personal data, 
individuals have the “right to be forgotten,” the right to request 
Internet search engine operators remove information from search 
results that is “inaccurate, inadequate, irrelevant, or excessive.”254 
                                                            
252 Van, supra note 6. 
253 Supra Part III.A. 
 
254 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, FACTSHEET ON THE “RIGHT TO BE 
FORGOTTEN” RULING (C-131/12) 2, available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/files/factsheets/factsheet_data_protection_en.pdf. See also Press 
Release No 70/14, Judgment in Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v 
Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, Mario Costeja González, Court of 
Justice of the European Union (May 13, 2014); Last Week Tonight with John 
Oliver: Right To Be Forgotten (HBO television broadcast May 19, 2014), 
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This thesis that one should be able to scourge his online footprint is 
not uncommon. Jeffrey Rosen argues that the Internet’s archival 
ability is threatening to “our ability to control our identities; to 
preserve the option of reinventing ourselves and starting anew; to 
overcome our checkered pasts,” and that we should be able to 
“wipe [our] reputation slates clean.”255 Jonathan Zittrain has 
suggested we should allow people to declare “reputation 
bankruptcy” and purge certain sensitive or damaging aspects of 
their online presence.256 These ideas are persuasive and may very 
well have a place in privacy law. They do not, however, 
necessarily undermine the concept of being privacy-proof. While 
those theories emphasize the value in shedding online baggage, the 
EU’s right to be forgotten is meant for the everyman while the 
privacy-proof doctrine—like the libel-proof doctrine—“is a 
limited, narrow one,”257 applicable only to those who have 
distinctly thrust themselves into the public spotlight online and so 
long as their disclosures stay relevant in the view of their 
respective audiences. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Spurred by changes in the quality and focus of journalism, 
Samuel Warren and William Brandeis observed that case law 
reflected a pressing need for a formal affirmation of a right to 
privacy.258 A right to privacy was not written into the Constitution, 
yet the subtext of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments suggest that they were ratified in that 
very interest.259 Modern privacy law continued to develop with that 
imprimatur, prompting William Prosser to bring the law in line 
with the prevailing views of the courts and public policy by 
offering the four privacy torts as a way of validating these 
                                                            
available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r-ERajkMXw0. 
255 Jeffrey Rosen, The Web Means the End of Forgetting, N.Y. TIMES, July 
21, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/magazine/25privacy-t2.html? 
pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
256 Id. 
257 Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882, 889 (2d Cir. 1976). 
258 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 101, at 196. 
259 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483–84 (1965). 
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principles.260 Each of these advancements in the law was driven by 
our changing perceptions of “man’s spiritual nature”261 and our 
society’s insistence on its protection. The privacy-proof plaintiff 
doctrine reflects our evolving understanding of the right to privacy 
and who and what it is meant to protect in our “global village.”262 
The Internet now demands that the law reevaluate the right to 
privacy. Social media sites, in particular, have transformed our 
interpersonal interactions and provided us each with a platform to 
amplify our voices and reach further to build connections. Yet is 
has also provided an opportunity to devalue and disclaim our 
privacy rights by making it easier to share our private, personal 
information with a large audience. Our online presence has become 
an extension of our physical self. As such, it should be governed 
by the same privacy principles as our offline presence. The 
privacy-proof plaintiff doctrine is premised on a reasonable 
expectation of privacy that is contingent upon the rights holder 
maintaining a certain degree of discretion in choosing what he 
makes public. Where a private person voluntarily discloses certain 
private or personal information about himself in a public forum, on 
a publicly accessible social media page or anywhere else in the 
public eye, he cannot then recover under one of the four privacy 
torts if the self-exposure was so outrageous or persistent in a way 
that would violate his demographic in-group social media or online 
norms. Even if the privacy-proof plaintiff doctrine reaches the 
same outcome as the traditional consent defense would, it serves as 
a useful, workable framework for analyzing the extent and effect 
of disclosure, especially on the Internet, where courts have not yet 
provided a bright-line rule. The privacy-proof plaintiff doctrine 
represents the caveat for maintaining a right to privacy on the 
Internet in that it simply requires each of us to meet the same 
community expectations for consent to the disclosure of private, 
personal information as would be required to enjoy one’s rights in 
the “real world.” 
 
                                                            
260 Prosser, supra note 34, at 389. 
261 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
262 SOLOVE, supra note 18, at 33. 
